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“[J]uveniles as a class have not the level of maturation and responsibility
that we presume in adults and consider desirable for full participation in
the rights and duties of modern life. The reasons why juveniles are not
trusted with the privileges and responsibilities of an adult also explain
why their irresponsible conduct is not as morally reprehensible as that of
an adult.”1

INTRODUCTION
Sixteen years after the United States Supreme Court declared capital
punishment constitutional for sixteen- and seventeen-year-old offenders in
Stanford v. Kentucky,2 the Court will revisit this issue in Roper v.
Simmons.3 The Court heard oral arguments for Roper on October 13, 2004,
and will determine the validity of the Missouri Supreme Court’s holding, in
State ex rel. Simmons v. Roper, that the juvenile death penalty is
unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual
Clause.4 In its surprising decision in 2003, the Missouri Supreme Court

1. In re Stanford, 537 U.S. 968, 969 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Stanford v.
Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 394-96 (1989)).
2. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
3. See State ex rel. Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397 (Mo. 2003) (en banc) (setting
aside the death sentence of Christopher Simmons, a death-row inmate who was seventeen at
the time of his offense, and holding that the execution of persons who were under the age of
eighteen at the time of the offense was unconstitutional), cert. granted, 540 U.S. 1160
(2004).
4. Id. at 399; see also State v. Simmons, 944 S.W.2d 165, 169-70 (Mo. 1997) (en
banc) (recounting the facts of the Simmons case). In summarizing the facts, the court stated
that Mr. Simmons devised a plan to commit a crime and had first described his plan to two
friends. Id. at 169. He described how he would find someone to burglarize and then murder
that person by tying together the person’s hands and feet and pushing the person off a
bridge. Id. In the early hours of September 9, 1993, Mr. Simmons and an accomplice (who
was also under eighteen at the time of the offense) broke into Shirley Crook’s home, bound
her hands and feet, and pushed her off a nearby railroad trestle to her death. Id. at 169-70.
Mr. Simmons told his friends that he believed they would “get away with it” because of
their age. Id. at 169.
The gruesome facts of this case indicate that the Missouri Supreme Court did not simply
spare Mr. Simmons’s life because the facts of his case warranted more lenient treatment.
The Missouri Supreme Court’s decision was based solely on the fact that Mr. Simmons was
a juvenile and that standards of decency had evolved since Stanford to the point where
juvenile executions should be considered cruel and unusual. State ex rel. Simmons v.
Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397, 399 (Mo. 2003) (en banc).
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appeared to have broken from Stanford by reversing the death sentence of
defendant Christopher Simmons, a seventeen-year-old at the time of the
crime, on constitutional grounds.5 This Comment suggests, however, that
the Missouri Supreme Court reached the correct result and advocates for a
broadening of the legal standard under which death penalty cases are
decided. Specifically, this Comment argues that the Supreme Court, in
Roper, should incorporate current scientific research on the development of
adolescent brains into its analysis of whether juvenile capital punishment
comports with the Eighth Amendment. In doing so, the Court should
ultimately hold that the execution of juveniles is constitutionally prohibited
under the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Clause.
Since 2000, numerous brain-scan studies have established that the
human brain does not fully mature until an individual is in his or her early
to mid-twenties.6 This empirical evidence was not available when the
Supreme Court last addressed the issue of the juvenile death penalty in
1989.7 Such scientific findings present a strong case that the Supreme
Court should make a categorical distinction between adults and juveniles
for the purpose of prosecuting capital offenses.8 This Comment proposes
that the Court should therefore integrate recent cognitive research on
juvenile brains into the modern capital punishment framework set forth in
Atkins v. Virginia.9 In advocating for a categorical distinction for juvenile
offenders with respect to the death penalty, this Comment reviews the
modern neurobiological and behavioral research on pre-frontal cortex

5. State ex rel. Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397 (Mo. 2003) (en banc); see also S.
Starling Marshall, “Predictive Justice”?: Simmons v. Roper and the Possible End of the
Juvenile Death Penalty, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 2889, 2890 (2004) (reporting that the
Missouri Supreme Court was criticized for not following the letter of the law as it was laid
out in Stanford, and instead acted on a “hunch” as to how the United States Supreme Court
would answer the question of juvenile capital punishment in the wake of Atkins v. Virginia,
536 U.S. 304 (2002)).
6. See Claudia Wallis, What Makes Teens Tick, TIME, May 10, 2004, at 59-60 (noting
that behavioral problems among adolescents can be attributed, in part, to immaturity in the
region of the brain that controls responsibility and the weighing of consequences); see also
discussion infra Part II.A (detailing contemporary scientific studies that evaluate the
developmental maturity of the juvenile pre-frontal cortex).
7. See Elizabeth R. Sowell et al., Development of Cortical and Subcortical Brain
Structures in Childhood and Adolescence: A Structural MRI Study, 44 DEVELOPMENTAL
MED. & CHILD NEUROLOGY 4 (2002) (explaining that technologically-advanced
neuroimaging tools replaced the dated technique of post-mortem observation in the 1990s).
8. See infra Part II.A (summarizing recent scientific studies that have found marked
differences in the functionality of adult and juvenile brains).
9. See 536 U.S. at 321 (holding that the death penalty is “cruel and unusual” for
mentally retarded offenders because these offenders are less legally culpable and thus the
punishment is excessive and disproportionate). The legal framework employed in Atkins is
relevant to a determination of the constitutionality of juvenile capital punishment because
the Court utilizes the same basic Eighth Amendment standard for every death penalty case.
See infra Part I.A (chronicling the high court’s death penalty jurisprudence and the
“evolving standards of decency” framework from the early twentieth century to the present).
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development that was unavailable at the time of Stanford. This Comment
argues that this research, when considered with a number of other relevant
factors, establishes that the “standards of decency” regarding the execution
of adolescents have evolved to a point where this practice must be
considered cruel and unusual.10
Part I of this Comment presents a brief history of death penalty
jurisprudence to place the current debate on juvenile capital punishment in
context.11 Part II.A discusses the pioneering scientific research on the
maturation of the pre-frontal cortex. Specifically, this section addresses
how cognitive differences between adults and juveniles affect vital
processes such as reasoning and problem solving. Part II.B compares the
immature development of the pre-frontal cortex in juveniles to that of the
mentally retarded and to persons with a dysfunctional or damaged prefontal cortex. In doing so, this section demonstrates that the various forms
of immature brain development can result in comparable behavioral
patterns and claims that juveniles therefore deserve the same categorical
exemption as the mentally retarded from society’s most severe form of
punishment. Finally, Part III deconstructs the legal standard that the Court
employs in death penalty cases—“the evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society”12—and proposes that the
“standards of decency” analysis be broadened to incorporate the
considerable psychological data on cognitive development to find that the
practice of executing juveniles is unconstitutional.
I.

Background Principles: The Evolution of Eighth Amendment Capital
Punishment Jurisprudence

The belief that juveniles are not psychologically mature or as legally
culpable as adults is not a new phenomenon. In fact, early English law
presumed that children under the age of seven were incapable of
committing crimes because they lacked the requisite mental intent.13 At
that time, a similar rebuttable presumption applied to children aged seven
10. Whether the death penalty in general is constitutional under the Eighth Amendment
is beyond the scope of this article.
11. While Part I.A primarily outlines the Supreme Court decisions regarding capital
punishment for juveniles, Part I.B addresses high court decisions involving the mentally
retarded because these decisions address similar issues and employ the same legal
framework. Part I.C reviews the Court’s most current and relevant death penalty decisions
and looks to the Court’s 2004-2005 term, when it is due to rule on the constitutionality of
the juvenile death penalty in Roper.
12. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
13. See Jeffery Fagan, Atkins, Adolescence, and the Maturity Heuristic: Rationales for
a Categorical Exemption for Juveniles from Capital Punishment, 33 N.M. L. REV. 207, 226
(2003) (explaining that youths’ crimes were not excused, but because children under the age
of seven may have lacked the element of criminal intent that was required to prove guilt for
adult offenders, their punishment was often commuted).
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to fourteen; youths between these ages were assumed incapable of
committing crimes unless the opposite was proven in a court of law.14
Evidence suggests that, while children under the age of fourteen may
theoretically have been eligible to receive the death penalty, courts in
England and the United States were reluctant to enforce this punishment
during the nineteenth century.15
Despite the apparent common law distinction between youths and adults,
the formal separation of children from adults in the American criminal
justice system did not appear until the late nineteenth century.16 Although
juveniles had been treated differently since the 1820s,17 Massachusetts was
the first state to begin trying juveniles separately from adults in 1875.18 By
the time Congress passed the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act in 1938,19
juvenile offenders in every state were being prosecuted in a separate
judicial system based, at least in part, on the notion that juveniles lacked
the skills and maturity of adults.20 Although this formal judicial distinction
14. See id. (noting that there was no officially sanctioned measure of criminal
culpability, and therefore, the determination of when a child was fully responsible for his or
her behavior was inconsistent, varying between courts and over time).
15. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ABA JUVENILE JUSTICE POLICIES: JUVENILE
DEATH PENALTY 985 (noting that, in one London court, 103 children under the age of
fourteen were sentenced to death between 1801 and 1836, but not one was actually
executed, and that only two juveniles less than fourteen years old were judicially executed
in the United States between the years 1806 and 1882), available at
http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/juvjus/jdppolicy.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2005); see also
Anthony Platt & Bernard L. Diamond, The Origins of the “Right and Wrong” Test of
Criminal Responsibility and Its Subsequent Development in the United States: An
Historical Survey, 54 CAL. L. REV. 1227, 1246 (1966) (concluding that there is no
justification for the contention that children were regularly executed in the United States
during the nineteenth century); Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Blaming Youth, 81
TEX. L. REV. 799, 804 (2003) (contending that at early common law, once children reached
fourteen years of age, they were presumed to have the moral capacity of adults, but that the
prosecutor had to prove the defendant understood the wrongfulness of his act).
16. See THOMAS HINE, THE RISE & FALL OF THE AMERICAN TEENAGER 173 (1999)
(observing that the Progressive era, around the turn of the twentieth century, pioneered
greater legal protections for juveniles from a number of dangers, such as excessive
punishment, but that the presumed incompetence of adolescents also resulted in the
constriction of their long-established rights).
17. See id. (acknowledging that many states had houses of refuge, truant schools, or
other systems in place to imprison young offenders separately from adult criminals before
the formal juvenile justice system emerged).
18. See id. (stating that this trend spread quickly and by 1909, ten states had separate
juvenile court systems); see also Commonwealth v. Donahue, 126 Mass. 51 (1878) (citing
the 1877 law that codified the practice of distinguishing between juvenile and adult trials).
19. Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act, ch. 486, 52 Stat. 74 (1938) (current version at 18
U.S.C. §§ 5031-5042 (2000)). The Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act (“the Act”) allowed
the Attorney General to seek the prosecution of a juvenile as an adult in special
circumstances, except where the offense carried the punishment of the death penalty or life
imprisonment. Id. The Act also prohibited juveniles from being sentenced to a term beyond
the age of twenty-one. Id. See also Fagan, supra note 13, at 227 n.106 (stating that prior to
1938, there was no federal legislation providing separate treatment of adults and juveniles
within the criminal justice system).
20. See Fagan, supra note 13, at 226 (noting that juveniles in various American colonial
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has become blurred,21 American society remains protective of juveniles
through minimum age statutes.22 Such statutes typically establish eighteen
as the threshold age for exercising certain rights and responsibilities,
illustrating that public opinion still recognizes adolescents as
psychologically less mature than adults.23 A distinction that permits the
justice system’s most extreme punishment for juveniles, yet prevents
juveniles from enjoying certain social privileges, is both hypocritical and
inconsistent.24
A. Capital Punishment for Juvenile Offenders
Opponents of the juvenile death penalty argue that the execution of
adolescents is unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment,25 given the
immaturity and reduced legal culpability of juveniles, because such
punishment violates the principle of proportionality.26 Over time, the
courts were subject to distinct culpability standards from adults, i.e., “mentally capable of
distinguishing between right and wrong”); see also HINE, supra note 16, at 173 (noting that
every state had a formally distinct juvenile court system by 1945, although juveniles did not
begin to share the same constitutional rights as adults for over two decades).
21. Today, juveniles under the age of eighteen can be subjected to adult criminal
liability in all states. Fagan, supra note 13, at 227-28. The Supreme Court’s decision in
Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966), which allowed courts to sentence juveniles to
the same punishments as adult offenders, further weakened judicial protection of juveniles.
Id. See also Julian V. Roberts, Public Opinion and Youth Justice, 31 CRIME & JUST. 495,
495 (2004) (crediting the shift to punishing juveniles as adults in part to the increased public
concern about youth crime).
22. See Fagan, supra note 13, at 232 (citing Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 823
(1988), and mentioning that the Thompson Court documented numerous examples of rights
and privileges that are not accorded to juveniles, including the right to serve on a jury, the
right to vote, and the right to marry).
23. See Hearing Before the House Criminal Justice and Public Safety Committee, 2004
Leg., 108 Cong. 2d Sess. (N.H. 2004) (testimony of David Fassler, M.D.) at 2 (mentioning
that eighteen is the minimum age limit to exercise the right to vote, enter military service,
marry,
and
make
independent
medical
decisions),
available
at
http://ccjr.policy.net/relatives/22020.pdf; see also Thompson, 487 U.S. at 823, 834 (inferring
that the American people have supported legislation prohibiting juveniles from serving on a
jury, marrying without parental consent, or purchasing alcohol and cigarettes, because they
recognize that juveniles are “less mature and responsible” and lack the “judgment” expected
of adults).
24. But see Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 374 (1989) (discounting minimum age
statutes as irrelevant to a determination of the constitutionality of the juvenile death penalty
because society cannot make individualized determinations about which youths are mature
enough to engage in certain activities, while the court system can consider the maturity of
each juvenile capital offender on a case-by-case basis).
25. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (providing that no “cruel and unusual punishments
[shall be] inflicted” upon any person).
26. See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982) (explaining that the principle of
proportionality is unique with respect to capital punishment because the Eighth Amendment
requires “individualized consideration as a constitutional requirement in imposing the death
sentence” (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978)). As a result, the
proportionality analysis is a subjective one that essentially focuses on the individual
culpability of the offender, and not the more objective analysis of whether death is an
appropriate punishment for murder. Id. The Enmund Court therefore focused on the
character and the record of the offender to determine if he or she had the “cold calculus that
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Supreme Court has established a framework that determines when a
punishment may be considered cruel and unusual. Around the turn of the
twentieth century, the Supreme Court, in Weems v. United States,27
mandated that the Cruel and Unusual Clause of the Eighth Amendment is
not static and inviolable, but rather “progressive, and is not fastened to the
obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened
by a humane justice.”28 The Court similarly interpreted the Cruel and
Unusual Clause almost a half a century later in Trop v. Dulles29 by
requiring that all punishments comport with “evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”30 The Trop Court,
however, did not limit its definition of society to a national one, but rather
considered the practices of all “civilized” nations when holding that the
practice of expatriation was cruel and unusual.31 In 1976, Gregg v.
precedes the decision to act.” Id. at 799 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 186
(1976)).
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority in Stanford, attempted to remove the
proportionality analysis completely, taking an objective approach to the death penalty
question. See Robert E. Searfoss III, Comment, Waiver of Juvenile Jurisdiction and the
Execution of Juvenile Offenders: Why the Eighth Amendment Should Require Proof of
Sufficient Mental Capacity Before the State Can Exact Punishment, 35 U. TOL. L. REV. 663,
672 (2004) (mentioning that Justice Scalia proposed that the Court refrain from imparting its
views on the culpability of the offender and should instead look primarily to whether state
legislatures endorse the practice). This approach is highly controversial among members of
the Court, however, and four dissenting Justices accordingly reproached the Stanford
majority for eliminating the measure of proportionality that they, and preceding Courts,
considered to be constitutionally required by the Eighth Amendment. Id.
The principle of proportionality is also embraced in Atkins, the Court’s most recent death
penalty case, holding that individual culpability is a critical part of the constitutionality
determination. See Fagan, supra note 13, at 230 (explaining that Justice Stevens’ majority
opinion in Atkins reasoned that the ultimate expression of moral outrage should be reserved
for offenders committing the most egregious conduct against society, and that juveniles,
who are less able to evaluate the consequences of their conduct, do not possess the moral
culpability deserving of such a serious sanction). Fagan suggests that the sanction of
executing juveniles is also excessive because it fails under both the retributive and
deterrence models of punishment. Id. See also Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592-98
(1977) (explaining that the Eighth Amendment bars punishments that are excessive in
relation to the crime committed, and, relying in part on legislative enactments and jury
verdicts, determining that the death penalty is a disproportionate punishment for the crime
of rape).
27. 217 U.S. 349 (1910) (holding that a fifteen-year imprisonment term for falsifying an
official public document was cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment).
28. See id. at 373 (“Time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and
purposes. Therefore a principle to be vital must be capable of wider application than the
mischief which gave it birth.”).
29. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
30. Id. at 101. “Evolving standards of decency” remains the standard under which all
death penalty cases are evaluated. See, e.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 821
(1988) (using the standard to determine if the death penalty is an appropriate punishment for
defendants who were less than sixteen at the time they committed the crime at issue); Gregg
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (invoking the standard as a means of determining if
the death penalty is an appropriate punishment for murder arising out of armed robbery).
31. See Trop, 356 U.S. at 102-03 (“The civilized nations of the world are in virtual
unanimity that statelessness is not to be imposed as punishment for crime. It is true that
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Georgia32 built on this standard and established that evolving standards of
decency are to be determined, not by the subjective views of the Court, but
by “objective indicia that reflect the public attitude toward a given
sanction.”33 Notably, the Gregg Court asserted that these indicia should
include, but should not be entirely comprised of, legislative judgments.34
Consistent with this standard, Thompson v. Oklahoma,35 in 1988,
rendered the death penalty unconstitutional for juveniles under the age of
sixteen, defining “evolving standards of decency” according to three
contemporary, objective factors.36 First, Justice Stevens’ opinion looked to
state legislative action as the primary indicator of public opinion on the
issue, finding that each of the eighteen states that had set a minimum age
for the execution of juveniles required the defendant to be at least sixteen
years of age at the time of the capital offense.37 Second, the Court looked
to the behavior of juries, citing the infrequent and haphazard imposition of
death sentences on adolescents under the age of sixteen by capital juries as
several countries prescribe expatriation . . . . But use of denationalization as punishment for
crime is an entirely different matter. The United Nations’ survey of the nationality laws of
84 nations of the world reveals that only two countries, the Philippines and Turkey, impose
denationalization as a penalty for desertion.”); see also discussion infra Part III.B
(considering the relevance of international law in determining if a practice is cruel and
unusual under the Eighth Amendment).
32. 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (upholding the constitutionality of Georgia’s death penalty
statute, which, before the death penalty could be imposed, required a bifurcated trial on the
issues of guilt and penalty, and a finding beyond a reasonable doubt of one of ten specified
aggravating circumstances).
33. See id. at 173 (adding that public perceptions of decency are not the only guide, but
that the punishment must also be proportional to the crime and not involve the unnecessary
and wanton infliction of pain). The Gregg Court also offered guidance to future courts by
holding that the death penalty is designed to serve the dual purposes of retribution and
deterrence of offenders and cautioned that when these two goals are not reached, the result
is the “gratuitous infliction of suffering.” Id. at 183.
34. See id. at 174 n.19 (“Although legislative measures adopted by the people’s chosen
representatives provide one important means of ascertaining contemporary values, it is
evident that legislative judgments alone cannot be determinative of Eighth Amendment
standards since that Amendment was intended to safeguard individuals from the abuse of
legislative power.”); see also Sharon Ongerth, Deference to the Majority: Why Isn’t the
Supreme Court Applying the Reasoning of Atkins v. Virginia to Juveniles?, 37 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 483, 505-06 (2003) (noting that a strict legislative count of states that do execute
juvenile offenders likely does not accurately depict the national consensus on this issue, as
only six states that have capital punishment statutes have actually executed a juvenile
offender since Stanford). See generally discussion infra Part III.A-B (reviewing the Court’s
recent move to redefine the meaning of “society” under the “evolving standards of decency”
framework).
35. 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
36. See id. at 824-25 (holding that juveniles’ immaturity can mitigate culpability and
that individualized consideration of maturity is inadequate, thus warranting a categorical
distinction for adolescents under the age of sixteen).
37. See id. at 824 (mentioning that in all fifty states, no minor under the age of sixteen
could vote, serve on a jury, or purchase pornographic materials, that in only one state could
a minor under sixteen drive, and that in only four states could such a minor marry without
parental consent). The Court concluded that the history of the law indicated that society
does not believe that a fifteen-year-old has the “capacity” to act as an adult. Id. at 825.
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an indication that the practice no longer comported with society’s decency
standards.38 Finally, the Court took into account the views of respected
national and international organizations, along with the legislative practices
of the international community, to determine “evolving standards.”39
In the following year, a divided 4-1-4 plurality in Stanford v. Kentucky40
deviated from the holding of the Thompson Court, concluding that the
Eighth Amendment did not prohibit the execution of sixteen- and
seventeen-year-old juveniles because current standards of decency are to be
determined almost entirely by statute.41 While Justice Scalia, writing for
the majority, did evaluate the behavior of juries when defining “evolving
standards of decency,” he rejected the opportunity to look to public opinion
polls, the views of professional organizations, and the international
community.42 Because the majority of states permitting the death penalty
allowed the punishment for sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds,43 Justice
38. See id. at 831 (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 249 (1972) and concluding
that the rarity of death penalty sentences that are imposed on juveniles reflects an inference
of arbitrariness, expressly prohibited by the Eighth Amendment); Jeffery M. Banks, Student
Article, In Re Stanford: Do Evolving Standards of Decency Under the Eighth Amendment
Jurisprudence Render Capital Punishment Inapposite for Juvenile Offenders?, 48 S.D. L.
REV. 327, 348 (2002-2003) (stating that only twenty-one juvenile executions have taken
place since 1973 (fourteen of which have occurred in Texas)). In 1973, most states had to
redraft their death penalty statutes in response to the procedural guidelines, formulated by
the Supreme Court in Furman, for implementing the death penalty. Id. See also Jill M.
Cochran, Note, Courting Death: 30 Years Since Furman, is the Death Penalty any Less
Discriminatory? Looking at the Problem of Jury Discretion in Capital Sentencing, 38 VAL.
U. L. REV. 1399, 1407-08 nn.40 & 42 (2004) (explaining that the death penalty was
generally so unpopular among juries that every state abolished the mandatory death penalty
because a jury would vote for acquittal instead of imposing the required sentence).
39. See Thompson, 487 U.S. at 830-31 (noting that the American Bar Association and
American Law Institute, among other professional organizations, denounced the practice,
and that Anglo-American nations including Canada, all of the Western European countries,
and the Soviet Union prohibited juvenile executions).
40. 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989).
41. See id. (upholding the death sentence of an offender who was seventeen-years-andfour-months-old at the time of his crime).
42. See id. at 377 (denouncing public opinion polls and views of interest groups and
professional organizations as “uncertain foundations” upon which to base constitutional
law). Justice Scalia did not directly address international law in his opinion; rather, he
failed to mention it, or to respond to the dissent’s application of international law when
determining that the death penalty for juveniles was against contemporary standards of
decency. Id. at 389-90 (Brennan, J., dissenting). But see Marshall, supra note 5, at 2926-27
(stating that international opinion on the death penalty was recognized as early as Trop and
remains an important indicator of societal norms). International consensus is at least as
strong on the issue of the juvenile death penalty as it is on the issue of executing the
mentally retarded and the Atkins majority considered international opinion in deciding on
the constitutionality of the death penalty for the mentally retarded. Id. Further, treaty law
on the death penalty is more explicit for juveniles than for the mentally retarded. Id.
43. See Stanford, 492 U.S. at 370 (stating that of the thirty-seven states that imposed the
death penalty in 1989, only fifteen declined to impose it on sixteen-year-olds and only
twelve declined to impose it on seventeen-year-olds). But see In re Stanford, 537 U.S. 968,
971 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that, since Stanford v. Kentucky was decided in
1989, no state has lowered the age of eligibility for the death penalty to sixteen or seventeen,
and that the legislative trend in determining the legal rights and obligations of juveniles in
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Scalia concluded that the practice met with public approval, as exemplified
through the workings of the democratic process.44
B. Capital Punishment for Mentally Retarded Offenders
In order to generate a thorough perspective of Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence for juvenile offenders, it is necessary to also survey the
Court’s jurisprudence respecting the execution of the mentally retarded, as
the Court’s treatment of these two issues is substantively similar.45
Accordingly, the Court decided Penry v. Lynaugh46 on the same day as
Stanford and, invoking the same standard used in Stanford, held that the
Eighth Amendment does not prohibit the execution of the mentally
retarded.47 The Court in Atkins v. Virginia, however, overturned this
decision in 2002 by a margin of 6-3 when it held that standards of decency
had evolved since Penry, and that capital punishment for the mentally
retarded was no longer constitutional.48 Following Thompson rather than
Stanford, Justice Stevens authored the majority decision in Atkins that
evaluated three main factors: legislative intent, the rarity of the imposition
of the death penalty on the mentally retarded, and the opinions of

other areas has been to require juveniles to be older rather than younger before they are
granted those rights and responsibilities).
44. See Stanford, 492 U.S. at 374-75 (finding that minimum age statutes are not
relevant to a determination of the constitutionality of the juvenile death penalty (e.g., that
the legislature did not intend for these statutes to dictate that all juveniles should be treated
differently than adults in every area of the law)). Justice Scalia theorized that individualized
testing of juveniles’ maturity levels is not possible with regard to all general social
privileges, so therefore a blanket exclusion is necessary in these cases. Id. Justice Scalia
contrasted that situation with the circumstances of a trial and concluded that because the
criminal justice system allows for each juvenile capital defendant to be judged on a case-bycase basis, such a categorical distinction is not appropriate for the death penalty. Id.
45. The issues are substantively similar because some of the same problematic
behavioral patterns observed in the mentally retarded are often observed, if to a lesser
degree, in juveniles and because the Supreme Court uses the same “evolving standards of
decency” framework for both issues. See discussion infra Part II.B (addressing specific
scientific data that indicates that youths with immature pre-frontal cortexes manifest some
comparable problematic behavioral patterns to people with damaged pre-frontal cortexes or
mental retardation).
46. 492 U.S. 302, 340 (1989) (claiming that legislative action and jury behavior
presented an insufficient national consensus to categorically prohibit the execution of
mentally retarded offenders).
47. See id. at 334 (finding that the execution of a twenty-two-year-old offender with the
mental age of six-and-a-half, who had organic brain damage and was mentally retarded, was
constitutional because only two states had enacted legislation categorically exempting the
mentally retarded from the death penalty).
48. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 313-15 (2002) (stating that the first death
penalty statute to prohibit execution of the mentally retarded was passed in 1986, only three
years before Penry was decided, and that by the time of Atkins, eighteen states had passed
legislation prohibiting the practice). When taken with the twelve states that prohibited the
death penalty entirely, the legislative count totaled thirty states, enough to establish a
national consensus against executing the mentally retarded. Id. at 316.
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professional, social, and religious organizations, as well as the international
community.49
C. Modern Capital Punishment Jurisprudence
The twenty-first century will likely continue to spawn even greater
developments in the Court’s death penalty jurisprudence. In the same year
as Atkins, Kevin Stanford petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of habeas
corpus in In re Stanford, yet the Court refused to grant certiorari on his
case.50 Although the majority did not issue an opinion, Justice Stevens
wrote a strong dissent, expressing a desire to “put an end to th[e] shameful
practice” of executing juveniles.51 Most notably, the dissenting Justices
broke with death penalty jurisprudence practice and cited recent scientific
evidence supporting a claim that adolescents are without the same
“capacity to control their conduct and to think in long-range terms” as
adults.52 The dissenting Justices further reasoned that no legislature had
lowered the age of the death penalty to sixteen or seventeen (from
eighteen) since Stanford.53 Rather, states were moving to abolish the death
penalty for juveniles.54
49. See id. at 316 n.21 (departing from Stanford by citing Thompson’s holding that the
Court should consider the views of “respected professional organizations, by other nations
that share our Anglo-American heritage, and by the leading members of the Western
European community”). The Atkins Court broadly held that public opinion had changed
considerably since Penry for the following reasons: a large number of states prohibited
capital punishment for the mentally retarded, even the states that permitted this practice
rarely executed the mentally retarded, and a broad social and professional consensus had
developed against the practice. Id. at 315-16. The Atkins decision was based on these three
foregoing factors, but also took into consideration the results of the Court’s independent
examination of the practice, which found that the punishment was excessive in light of the
diminished culpability of the mentally retarded. Id. at 321.
50. 537 U.S. 968 (2002).
51. See id. at 972 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (dissenting opinion joined by Justices Breyer,
Ginsburg, and Souter).
52. Id. at 970 (citing Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 395 (1989) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (citing TWENTIETH CENTURY TASK FORCE ON SENTENCING POLICY TOWARD
YOUNG OFFENDERS, CONFRONTING YOUTH CRIME 7 (1958)). Justice Stevens’ dissenting
opinion presented scientific advances such as magnetic resonance imaging (“MRI”) studies
to support the claim that juveniles “are more vulnerable, more impulsive, and less selfdisciplined than adults.” Id. Until In re Stanford, the Court had not used scientific evidence
to support the claim that the death penalty was unconstitutional with regard to juveniles or
the mentally retarded, perhaps because there was no such evidence available. See also
Marshall, supra note 5, at 2928-29 (stating, in reference to Justice Stevens’ comment in In
re Stanford regarding MRI studies on juvenile pre-frontal cortex development, that “[s]ome
Supreme Court Justices recently took notice of this new vein of research”).
53. In re Stanford, 537 U.S. at 971.
54. See id. at 969 (indicating that since Stanford, four state legislatures (Indiana,
Kansas, Montana, and New York) and the Supreme Court of the State of Washington had
forbidden the execution of persons under the age of eighteen). Justice Stevens pointed out
that the number of state statutes that opposed the death penalty for juveniles in October
2002 (twenty-eight) was only two fewer than the number of state statutes that opposed the
death penalty for the mentally retarded in June 2002 (thirty), a number sufficient for the
Atkins Court to hold that the national consensus did not support the practice of executing the
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Juvenile capital punishment continued to garner the attention of the
courts during this period. Less than a year after In re Stanford, the
Missouri Supreme Court heard State ex rel. Simmons v. Roper,55 a similar
case regarding a juvenile who had committed a capital crime.56 In August
2003, the Missouri Supreme Court declared the execution of juveniles cruel
and unusual and predicated their ruling on the Supreme Court’s reasoning
in Thompson and Atkins, holding that a national consensus against
executing juveniles had evolved since Stanford.57 Looking at national
legislation in 2003, sixteen states prohibited the execution of juveniles
under eighteen58 and eleven other states, as well as the District of
Columbia, barred the death penalty at the time of this decision.59 The
mentally retarded. Id. at 968. Justice Stevens reasoned that it was remarkable that state
legislatures were even making a point to change their statutes regarding juvenile capital
punishment during this period, considering that only two percent of the population of death
row inmates were juveniles, thus implying that few state legislatures would be compelled to
change their existing statutes when their state had not implemented the practice in decades.
Id. at 972. He concluded that because the states that changed their death penalty statutes
uniformly did so by raising the age for execution to eighteen, public opinion had clearly
shifted since Stanford. Id.
55. 112 S.W.3d 397 (Mo. 2003) (en banc), cert. granted, 540 U.S. 1160 (2004).
56. Id. The Missouri Supreme Court originally heard Christopher Simmons’ case in
1997, and rejected the argument that Mr. Simmons’ age was a mitigating circumstance that
would consequently bar the imposition of the death penalty. State v. Simmons, 944 S.W.2d
165, 191 (Mo. 1997) (en banc). The Missouri Supreme Court, in 1997, upheld his death
sentence under controlling state precedent. Id. Mr. Simmons, however, brought a second
appeal in 2002 after Atkins, where he argued that a national consensus against the execution
of juveniles had developed since Stanford. Simmons, 112 S.W.3d at 399.
57. Simmons, 112 S.W.3d at 401. The Missouri Supreme Court did not refuse to follow
Stanford or the national “evolving standards of decency” framework. Id. Instead, the
Simmons Court held that the rationale for the Supreme Court’s decision in Stanford—that
the execution of juveniles was not cruel or unusual—had disappeared as a result of recent
state legislative enactments prohibiting the execution of juveniles, and that sentencing
juveniles to death had become truly unusual over the decade or so since Stanford. Id. The
Missouri court also relied on Thompson and Atkins in considering the views of respected
national and international organizations to determine that society’s “standards of decency”
had evolved. Id.
58. California (CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.5(a) (West 1999)); Colorado (COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 18-1.3-1201 (West 2002)); Connecticut (CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a46a(h)(1)(West 2001)); Illinois (720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1(b) (West 2002)); Indiana
(IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-3(b)(1) (Michie 2004)); Kansas (KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4622)
(1995)); Maryland (MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-202(b)(2)(i) (2002)); Montana (MONT.
CODE ANN. § 45-5-102(2) (2003)); Nebraska (NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-105.01(1) (Supp.
2003)); New Jersey (N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:4A-22(a), 2C:11-3(g) (West 1987, Supp.
2004)); New Mexico (N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-6-1(A), 31-18-14(A) (Michie 2002)); New
York (N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27(1)(a)-(b) (McKinney 2004)); Ohio (OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 2929.023, 2929.03(E) (West 2003)); Oregon (OR. REV. STAT. § 137.707(2) (2003));
Tennessee (TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 37-1-102(4), 37-1-103, 37-1-134(a)(1) (2001));
Washington (State v. Furman, 858 P.2d 1092, 1103 (Wash. 1993) (en banc) (interpreting the
Washington code to comply with Thompson)).
59. Alaska (ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.015 (Michie 2004); District of Columbia (D.C.
CODE ANN. § 22-2104 (2001); Hawaii (HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 706-656 (Michie 2003);
Iowa (IOWA CODE ANN. § 902.1 (West 2003); Maine (ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A,
§§ 1152, 1251 (West 1964, Supp. 2004); Massachusetts (Commonwealth v. Colon-Cruz,
470 N.E.2d 116, 124 (Mass. 1984) (barring the death penalty for guilty pleas entered in the
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Missouri Supreme Court specifically noted that, while no state had lowered
the age for execution below eighteen in the fourteen years since Stanford,
five states had raised the minimum age to, or established it at, eighteen.60
Following the same analysis as Atkins, the court in Simmons interpreted the
Eighth Amendment “in a flexible and dynamic manner,”61 as set forth in
Stanford.62 The Supreme Court must now decide if the Missouri Supreme
Court was correct in finding that standards have evolved since Stanford and
determine if the death penalty framework shall follow that of Stanford or
Atkins.
II. INCORPORATING SCIENCE INTO THE CONSTITUTIONAL CALCULUS
A. Scientific Research on Juvenile Cognitive Development
For many years, scientists believed that the brain reached maturity in the
pre-adolescent years.63 Yet recent technological advancements, such as the
onset of high-resolution magnetic resonance imaging (“MRI”) in the
1980s,64 have changed the way that researchers examine the brain65 and

absence of a jury trial)); Michigan (MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 46 (1963); MICH. COMP. LAWS §
750.316 (2003); Minnesota (MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.10, 609.185 (West 2003); North
Dakota (N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-01 (1997); Rhode Island (R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-23-2
(2002); West Virginia (W. VA. CODE §61-11-2 (1965); Wisconsin (WIS. STAT. ANN. §§
939.50(3)(a), 940.01 (West 1996, Supp. 2004).
60. See Simmons, 112 S.W.3d at 408 (noting that Indiana and Montana raised the age of
execution to eighteen, Kansas and New York reinstated the death penalty solely for
offenders over the age of eighteen at the time of the crime, and the Washington Supreme
Court held that its state statute could not be construed to authorize the death penalty for
juveniles).
61. Id. at 406.
62. See id. at 406-07 (basing its decision on the following objective indicia in order to
align the decision with the reasoning of Stanford: state legislation, frequency of the
imposition of the death penalty on juveniles, national and international opinion, and an
independent court examination).
63. See Wallis, supra note 6, at 56-58 (noting that psychological literature tracing back
to Jean Piaget, a prominent Swiss developmental psychologist, posits that even the most
sophisticated human brain development is complete by the age of twelve).
64. See Florence Antoine, Cooperative Group Evaluating Diagnostic Imaging
Techniques, 81 J. NAT’L CANCER INST. 1347, 1348 (1989) (“MRI measures the response of
atoms in different tissues when they are pulsed with radio waves that are under the influence
of magnetic fields thousands of times the strength of the earth’s. Each type of tissue
responds differently, emitting characteristic signals from the nuclei of its cells. The signals
are fed into a computer, the position of those atoms is recorded, and a composite picture of
the body area being examined is generated and studied in depth.”); see also Wallis, supra
note 6, at 62 (discussing the difference between MRI and functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI): MRI simply reveals brain structure, whereas fMRI actually shows brain
activity while subjects are performing tasks).
65. See Sowell, supra note 7, at 4 (discussing that these neuroimaging tools differ
largely from that which was available during the Thompson and Stanford era, when postmortem observations were the main device for understanding brain development). This new
technology has allowed researchers to understand how a live brain operates and how it
develops longitudinally over time. Id.
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have cast doubt on this theory. Current MRI and behavioral studies
indicate that the brain does not fully mature until the early- to midtwenties.66 There is also clear evidence that the brain does not reach its full
weight until approximately age twenty and that the “myelination” process67
continues into the early twenties;68 markedly so in young men.69 Variance
in myelination is associated with differences in intelligence, indicating that
increased complexity of the brain’s nervous system appears to result in
more effective brain functioning.70
One of the most high profile of these contemporary MRI studies has
advanced the theory that significant neuronal connections in the brain also
continue their “pruning” process71 into the early twenties.72 Despite the
66. See, e.g., Jay N. Giedd et al., Brain Development During Childhood and
Adolescence: A Longitudinal MRI Study, 2 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 861, 861 (1999)
(concluding that the volume of cortical gray matter, where nerve centers are housed,
continues to increase through the age of twenty); see also Wallis, supra note 6, at 58
(explaining that studies show that gray and white matter in the brain may develop until
around age twenty-five). But see Scott & Steinberg, supra note 15, at 811 (theorizing that
adolescents’ cognitive capacity for reasoning may be comparable to that of adults and that
the differences between these two age groups exist mainly in adolescents’ application of
their mental skills when reacting in stressful, real-life situations).
67. See MICHAEL S. GAZZANIGA ET AL., COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE: THE BIOLOGY OF
THE MIND 27-28, 41-42 (1998) (explaining that myelination is the process where the
conduction of nerve impulses along the axon are increasingly coated with white matter
called myelin as the adolescent brain matures, making the connections quicker and more
reliable).
68. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 13, Patterson v. Texas, 536 U.S. 984 (2002)
[hereinafter Patterson Petition] (describing that these results were obtained from a study
performed on young adults between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five), available at
http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/juvjus/supreme%20court%20 petition.pdf.
A finding that brain weight continues to increase through the mid-twenties correlates with
a marked increase in violent crime among persons in late adolescence. See Fagan, supra
note 13, at 235 (theorizing that a peak in crime rates in late adolescence and a subsequent
decline in early adulthood may be partially explained by a general immaturity in
psychosocial development among juveniles). But see John H. Laub & Robert J. Sampson,
Understanding Desistance from Crime, 28 CRIME & JUST. 1, 46-48 (2001) (discussing the
important influence of peer variables on the correlation of age and crime).
69. See Ruben C. Gur, Ph.D., Declaration of Ruben C. Gur, Ph.D. at 11, Patterson v.
Texas, 536 U.S. 984 (2002) (expert opinion on the juvenile death penalty in support of the
state Habeas Corpus Petition) (claiming that the maturation of white matter in the prefrontal cortex is typically slower in males and extends later into the twenties, and that MRI
analyses on pre-adolescent children show a similar pattern where white matter in females’
brains typically matures more quickly than in the males’ brains), available at
http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/juvjus/Gur%20affidavit. pdf.
70. See Edward M. Miller, Intelligence and Brain Myelination: A Hypothesis, 17
PERSONALITY AND INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 803, 804 (1994) (hypothesizing that brains that
have achieved a higher level of myelination are faster and less prone to error). Myelination
results in quicker connections between neurons and it appears that the more effective each
neuron, the fewer the neurons that need to be activated for each problem, which in turn
appears to conserve energy in the more “intelligent” brains. Id.
71. See Interview with Jay Giedd, in Frontline: Inside the Teen Brain [hereinafter
Interview with Dr. Jay Giedd] (explaining that the “pruning” process is the thinning of gray
matter as excess connections between brain cells are eliminated, making the the nueronal
process
more
efficient),
available
at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/
frontline/shows/teenbrain/interviews/giedd.html. The brain’s gray matter continues to
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fact that brain density typically reaches ninety to ninety-five percent of its
adult size by the age of six,73 research shows that the pre-frontal cortex—
responsible for organization, decision-making, rational thought and other
executive functions—is the last part of the brain to mature.74 Instead of
using the pre-frontal cortex to make decisions, research indicates that
adolescents rely more heavily on the amygdala, the emotional center of the
brain.75 Consequently, adolescents typically exhibit poorer risk assessment
than adults76 and behave in a more impulsive manner.77
Brain-imaging studies that concentrate on adolescents’ over-reliance on
the emotional center of the brain have specifically found that juveniles may
misidentify the emotions of others as a result.78 While one hundred percent
of participants aged eighteen or older were able to correctly identify the
emotion of fear on a test subject, only about half of those under the age of
eighteen were able to do so.79 Such a finding indicates that adolescents

thicken until around the age of eleven for girls and twelve for boys. Id.
72. See Sharon Begley, Getting Inside a Teen Brain, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 28, 2000, at 58
(explaining that Dr. Jay Giedd of the National Institute of Mental Health performed MRI
studies on the brains of healthy subjects whose ages ranged from four to twenty-one).
73. See Wallis, supra note 6, at 59 (noting that humans are born with most of the
neurons their brains will ever have).
74. See id. at 59-60 (attributing behavioral problems in adolescents not only to
hormonal changes, but to the immaturity of the part of the brain that is attributed to
responsibility and the weighing of consequences).
75. See id. at 62 (noting that this may explain why adolescents have difficulty reading
emotional signals).
76. See Susan A. Ferguson, Other High-Risk Factors for Young Drivers—How
Graduated Licensing Does, Doesn’t, or Could Address Them, 34 J. SAFETY RES. 71, 72
(2003) (indicating that studies have documented that teen drivers have different risk
perception than adult drivers, drive in a more risky manner, and tend to rate hazardous
situations as less risky than adults). Although this observation is compounded by the fact
that young drivers have limited driving skill and experience, there is evidence to support the
assertion that, skill notwithstanding, teens’ assessments of their own ability level are not
commensurate with their actual limited abilities, and can therefore result in particularly
risky behavior. Id.
77. See Wallis, supra note 6, at 62 (reporting that researchers believe that rapidly
changing dopamine-rich areas of adolescent brains affect inhibitions); see also One Reason
Teens Respond Differently to the World: Immature Brain Circuitry, in Frontline: Inside
the Teen Brain: [hereinafter Immature Brain Circuitry] (explaining that the relative lack of
activation of the frontal cortex compared to the amygdala leads to an increased reliance on
the emotional center of the brain which is more likely to result in a “gut reaction”),
available
at
http://www.pbs.org/
wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/teenbrain/interviews/todd.html. In response to these results,
Dr. Yurgelun-Todd theorized that juveniles will respond to emotional situations in a more
impulsive manner, instead of with a thoughtful or measured response that is more likely in
the case of a person with a mature pre-frontal cortex. Id.
78. See Immature Brain Circuitry, supra note 77 (stating that neuropsychologist Dr.
Yurgelun-Todd drew this conclusion from an fMRI study that asked adults and adolescents,
between the ages of eleven and seventeen, to identify human emotions in photographs).
79. See id. (discovering that images of teen brains indicated considerably less activity in
the frontal lobes and much greater activity in the amygdala in comparison to adult brains).
Dr. Yurgelun-Todd explained that when viewing pictures of people exhibiting the emotion
of fear, teens often labeled the expressions incorrectly as sadness, anger, or confusion. Id.

FERGUSON.OFFTOPRINTER

456

8/9/2005 1:09:41 PM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:441

process emotional information from external stimuli differently than adults
and are therefore more likely to misunderstand situations with others and
react inappropriately as a result.80
Neuro-scientific research has also shown that the brain’s neuronal
pathways are continuing to transform throughout the adolescent period.81
Because the relative size of the pre-frontal cortex decreases during this
“remodeling” phase, the formation of new nerve connections and the
“pruning” of other connections have a substantial impact on goal-directed
behaviors.82 Additionally, adolescents typically show less activity in the
pre-frontal cortex than adults when exposed to a variety of stimuli.83
Scientists theorize that this may be due to the continuing development of
neuronal pathways, most notably in the stressor-sensitive brain regions.84
Consequently, juveniles may seek additional stimuli by way of risk-taking
behavior.85
80. Considering that fear is likely to be a common expression encountered in the
commission of a capital crime, the fact that adolescents exhibit a substantially impaired
ability to correctly identify the emotion of fear, and consequently often confuse a fearful
expression with one of anger or confusion, is vitally relevant when considering the level of
culpability to attach to a juvenile offender’s behavior. Cf. id. (noting that most “fairly
sophisticated adolescents did not correctly identify fear” in a clinical study).
81. See L.P. Spear, The Adolescent Brain and Age-Related Behavioral Manifestations,
24 NEUROSCIENCE & BIOBEHAVIORAL REVS. 417, 446 (2000) (concluding that the adolescent
brain is in transition and differs both anatomically and neurochemically from that of an
adult).
82. See Linda Patia Spear, Neurobehavioral Changes in Adolescence, 9 CURRENT
DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOLOGICAL SCI. 111, 112-13 (2000) (analyzing that behaviors such as
rule learning, spatial learning, and the emotional processing of aversive stimuli are greatly
affected by the “pruning” process).
83. See, e.g., Immature Brain Circuitry, supra note 77 (illustrating that adolescents have
less pre-frontal cortex activity when discerning emotions from pictures by comparing fMRIs
of an adolescent brain and an adult brain).
84. See Spear, supra note 81, at 446 (explaining that the stress-sensitive brain regions,
whose neuronal pathways are undergoing a great degree of remodeling, are responsible for
moderating the flow of motivationally relevant information received from various stimuli).
In other words, the neurons in these areas are responsible for assessing the value of
incoming stimuli. Spear, supra note 82, at 113. The less developed these neuronal
pathways, the lesser the value attained from the incoming stimuli, thus resulting in more
subdued cognitive activity than is observed with more developed brains in response to the
same level of stimuli. Spear, supra note 81, at 446. This subdued cognitive response
increases the likelihood that adolescents will seek out more risky activities in an attempt to
elicit more rewarding feedback. Id. This developmental cycle may explain how the stresssensitive dopamine system in the brain is related to novelty seeking, which is a common
behavioral alteration seen in adolescence. Spear, supra note 82, at 113. Spear, however,
cautions that, in addition to cognitive studies, it is necessary to investigate the “complex
multidirectional influences among environmental context, behavior, hormones and brain
function during the transitions of adolescence,” because the causality between brain
maturity and risk-taking behavior cannot be automatically inferred. Spear, supra note 81, at
447.
85. See Spear, supra note 81, at 446-47 (offering that a propensity to seek additional
reinforcing stimuli may be expressed in alcohol and drug use and other problem behaviors,
especially when bolstered by a juvenile’s social environment); see also Spear, supra note
82, at 113 (claiming that increases in dopamine in the pre-frontal cortex and the limbic
region may contribute to the behavioral modifications seen in adolescents). These
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Such scientific findings are particularly significant when understood in a
broader sociological context because they indicate that adolescents under
the age of eighteen have diminished decision-making capacity when
compared with adults, especially when subjected to stressful situations.86
Specifically, adolescents tend to have greater susceptibility to peer
influence when making decisions and conducting cost-benefit analyses,87
lack realistic risk-assessment abilities,88 and are not as future-oriented as
adults.89 Evidence also suggests that the rate of brain maturation can be
severely retarded by abuse and neglect—conditions that affect most
juvenile offenders on death row.90 These and other factors serve to
exacerbate a juvenile’s cognitive immaturity, and consequently, lessen
legal responsibility.91
modifications include the pursuit of new, exciting, potentially rewarding stimuli and a
visible, increased importance placed on social reinforcement from peers. Id.
86. See Patterson Petition, supra note 68, at 15 (establishing that, in stressful situations,
adolescents are less able than adults to use even their most advanced cognitive skills as
effectively and are unable to foresee consequences of unanticipated events at the same level
as adults); cf. Spear, supra note 81, at 431 (noting that substantial research indicates that
adolescent rodents differ both behaviorally and physiologically in the way they respond to
stressors when compared with adult rodents).
87. See Brief of Amici Curiae American Medical Association et al. at 5-6, Roper v.
Simmons, 540 U.S. 1160 (2004) (No. 03-633) [hereinafter AMA Brief] (claiming that while
adolescents do know the difference between right and wrong and have the ability to conduct
cost-benefit analyses, adolescents are often unable to perceive risks accurately, the way
adults do). This conclusion was reflected in a study of over 1,000 adolescents and adults
that showed that general psychosocial maturity continues to develop until around the age of
nineteen, at which point it plateaus. Id. at 7.
88. Id.; see also Ferguson, supra note 76, at 72 (discussing driving abilities).
89. See Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence:
Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58
AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1, 4-5 (2003) (“Whereas cognitive capacities shape the process of
decision making, psychosocial immaturity can affect decision-making outcomes, because
these psychosocial factors influence adolescent values and preferences in ways that drive the
cost-benefit calculus in the making of choices.”).
90. See NATIONAL COALITION TO ABOLISH THE DEATH PENALTY, FACT SHEET: THE
JUVENILE DEATH PENALTY, at http://www.ncadp.org/juvenile_fact_sheet.html (last visited
Jan. 12, 2005) (on file with the American University Law Review) (arguing that
international, medical, and social factors militate to the abolition of the death penalty for
adolescents).
This Comment does not address such childhood abuse and its effects on brain maturation
because it purely attempts to analyze general trends in adolescent cognitive development in
order to advocate for a categorical ban on juvenile capital punishment. It is worth noting,
however, that many juvenile offenders on death row have seriously under-developed brains
or cognitive disorders. See, e.g., Maria M. Homan, Note, The Juvenile Death Penalty:
Counsel’s Role in the Development of a Mitigation Defense, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 767, 769-76
(1987) (reviewing studies that indicate that juvenile murderers frequently share similar
childhood experiences of abuse, neglect, educational deprivation, and undiagnosed
psychiatric and neurological disorders). This evidence makes the comparison between
mentally retarded offenders and juvenile offenders even more relevant and provides greater
support for adopting a similar legal framework for both issues.
91. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835 (1988) (“[T]he Court has already
endorsed the proposition that less culpability should attach to a crime committed by a
juvenile than to a comparable crime committed by an adult.”); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455
U.S. 104, 115-16 (1982) (“[Y]outh is more than a chronological fact. It is a time and
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The foregoing scientific findings have gained wide acceptance among
medical and legal professional organizations.92 Support from some of the
most prominent professional groups in the fields of psychology, psychiatry
and neurobiology indicates that, while the foregoing findings may be
contemporary, they are simultaneously reliable and corroborated by similar
research on pre-frontal cortex development in adolescents.93 Accordingly,
the Fourth Edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (“DSM-IV”) limits the diagnosis of anti-social personality
disorder to individuals over the age of eighteen because psychiatrists
typically cannot make a reliable judgment about an adolescent’s personality
prior to this age.94 Such a diagnostic restriction likely indicates that a caseby-case analysis is not a workable approach with respect to personality
disorders, and instead, that a categorical distinction for juveniles under
eighteen is necessary as a result of tangible cognitive differences between
juveniles and adults.95 Further, in 2002, the American Bar Association
released a statement that summarized current brain research and urged all
states to ban the practice of executing juveniles.96
Although Justice Scalia, in his majority opinion in Stanford v. Kentucky,
rejected the use of professional opinions and scientific evidence to gauge

condition of life when a person may be most susceptible to influence and to psychological
damage. . . . Particularly ‘during the formative years . . . minors often lack the experience,
perspective, and judgment’ expected of adults.”) (quoting Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622,
635 (1979)).
92. See INT’L JUSTICE PROJECT, BRAIN DEVELOPMENT, CULPABILITY AND THE DEATH
PENALTY (discussing that the American Psychiatric Association and the American Academy
of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry have joined the American Society of Adolescent
Psychiatry in endorsing findings on adolescents’ brains and adopting policies opposing the
death penalty for juveniles under the age of eighteen), available at
http://www.internationaljusticeproject.org/pdfs/juvBrainDev.pdf (last visited Feb. 19, 2005).
93. See, e.g., AMA Brief, supra note 87, at iv-xii (supporting the argument of eight
medical, social work, and mental health organizations that the juvenile death penalty should
be abolished by citing over fifty psychological and neurobiological research papers that
addressed the immaturity of the adolescent pre-frontal region).
94. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Roper v. Simmons, No. 03-633, at 40-41 (U.S.
Oct. 13, 2004) (explaining that there are a number of confounding factors related to
adolescent personality development that make it difficult for psychiatrists to determine if
anti-social behavior is part of the juvenile’s fixed character), available at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/03633. pdf.
95. See KENTUCKY DEP’T OF PUB. ADVOCACY, MENTAL HEALTH & EXPERTS MANUAL
ch.5 (6th ed. 2002) (proffering that prior to the age of eighteen, personalities are often not
well-developed, and the problematic traits that are observed during adolescence may
disappear during early adulthood).
96. See Press Release, American Bar Association, Impending Execution of Juvenile
Offender Runs Counter to Midwest and National Trends to Abolish Juvenile Death Penalty
(Apr. 23, 2002) (stating that proposed bills in state legislatures that attempt to abolish the
juvenile death penalty come at a time when new research on adolescent brain development
increasingly finds that the intellectual and reasoning capacities of young people are less
developed
than
those
of
adults),
available
at
http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/juvjus/simmonspressrel.html.
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modern society’s conception of “decency,”97 it is important to note that
MRI studies were in their infancy at the time of the Stanford decision.98
Current scientific evidence can therefore no longer be said to be simply
“junk science.”99 The studies on brain maturity in adolescents have
appropriately begun to shape the opinions of professional organizations,100
and therefore, should play a role in determining the constitutionality of the
juvenile death penalty, particularly in light of the Atkins v. Virginia
decision.101 Therefore, since the majority in Stanford called for interpreting
the Eighth Amendment in a “flexible and dynamic manner” and held that
standards of decency “should be informed by objective factors to the
maximum possible extent,”102 and cognitive science has advanced
substantially since 1989, scientific evidence should be considered as one of
the vital objective factors in Roper v. Simmons.
B. Comparing Frontal Lobe Dysfunction, Mental Retardation, and
Juvenile Cognitive Development
While the Roper Court should follow the Atkins framework because it is
97. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 378-79 (1989) (disparagingly referring to
the evidence cited in the petitioner’s brief, regarding the psychological and emotional
development of sixteen and seventeen-year-olds, as “socioscientific” and “ethicoscientific”).
Specifically, Justice Scalia stated that the Court has no power to substitute its own belief in
scientific evidence with “society’s apparent skepticism.” Id. Justice Scalia’s rejection of
science as a possible foundation on which to base constitutional law is, however, at odds
with Supreme Court jurisprudence. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494-95
n.11 (1954) (citing K.B. CLARK, EFFECT OF PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION ON
PERSONALITY DEVELOPMENT (1950); WITMER & KOTINSKY, PERSONALITY IN THE MAKING
(1952); Deutscher & Chein, The Psychological Effects of Enforced Segregation: A Survey
of Social Science and Opinion, 26 J. PSYCHOL. 259 (1948); Chein, What Are the
Psychological Effects of Segregation Under Conditions of Equal Facilities?, 3 INT’L J.
OPINION & ATTITUDE RES. 229 (1949)) (referring to psychological research as “modern
authority” to support the proposition that the segregation of white and black children in
public schools was a denial of equal protection because it created feelings of inferiority
among the minority students and was detrimental to the students’ education).
98. See Antoine, supra note 64, at 1347 (noting that doctors began to use MRI
diagnostic techniques in the 1980s).
99. But see Paul Davies, Psychiatrists Question Death for Teen Killers, WALL ST. J.,
May 26, 2004, at B1 (contrasting support for the science with criticism accusing scientists of
manipulating their work to argue their personal positions against the death penalty).
100. See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS’N, JUVENILE JUSTICE CTR., NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS THAT
OPPOSE THE JUVENILE DEATH PENALTY (listing various respected, professional organizations
that oppose the death penalty, including the American Academy of Pediatrics, the American
Bar Association, the Coalition for Juvenile Justice, the National Association for Children’s
Behavioral Health, the National Association of Social Workers, the National Council on
Crime and Delinquency, the National Education Association, and the National Mental
Health Association), available at http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/juvjus/nationalorgs.pdf
(last visited Feb. 19, 2005).
101. See 536 U.S. 304, 317-21 (2002) (reasoning that in addition to legislative behavior,
clinical evaluations of the mentally retarded—specifically evidence of diminished reasoning
capacity and impulse control—are relevant when determining society’s “evolving standards
of decency” with respect to the death penalty for this group).
102. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 369 (internal citations omitted).
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the Court’s most recent response to the death penalty question, this
assertion is further strengthened through an analysis of the cognitive and
behavioral commonalities that exist between juveniles and the mentally
retarded.103 And because aggressive and violent behavior is associated with
stunted brain development,104 it is also instructive to place cognitive
development on a continuum, looking first to the effects of damaged or
severely immature frontal lobes as the most extreme example of poor
cognitive functioning.105 While incomplete frontal lobe development in
normal adolescents is likely not as extreme as in those with frontal lobe
dysfunction or mental retardation, a comparison of cognitive and
behavioral studies among these groups provides a better understanding of
how juveniles’ immature brains can lead to a similar pattern of behavior.
Establishing such a continuum of cognitive development, particularly
between the mentally handicapped and juveniles, and correlating brain
development among these groups with problem behavior, further
establishes a case for utilizing the Atkins reasoning in Roper.
Pre-frontal cortex damage is generally associated with serious behavioral
changes.106 In a famous study examining brain damage and criminal
behavior, positron emission tomography (“PET”)107 brain scans evaluated
the frontal lobes of violent offenders to explain such variances in behavior,
and found significantly lower levels of frontal lobe activity in the offenders
than in that of the control group, indicating some frontal lobe
dysfunction.108 Researchers concluded that there is a “strong association
103. See infra notes 111-125 and accompanying text (outlining differences and
similarities in cognitive abilities of juveniles and the mentally retarded).
104. See infra notes 108-110 and accompanying text (discussing a clinical study of the
pre-frontal brain activity of murderers).
105. Evaluating immature juvenile cognitive development on a continuum with prefrontal cortex damage and mental retardation makes a reliance on Atkins all the more
sensible when determining the constitutionality of the juvenile death penalty. In addition,
an understanding of an offender’s cognitive maturity level is essential to analyzing the
proportionality of the punishment. See generally Steinberg & Scott, supra note 89 (looking
at juvenile criminal culpability from a developmental perspective).
106. See Jessie A. Seiden, Comment, The Criminal Brain: Frontal Lobe Dysfunction
Evidence in Capital Proceedings, 16 CAP. DEF. J. 395, 399-400 (2004) (explaining that
because the brain’s frontal region is the seat of impulse control, reasoning, and sociallyresponsible judgment, damage to the frontal lobes often causes violent and aggressive
behavior).
107. See id. at 401 (explaining that PET scans differ from MRI scans in that they show
blood flow and metabolic activity rather than brain structure); HOWARD HUGHES MEDICAL
INSTITUTE, NEW IMAGING TECHNIQUES THAT SHOW THE BRAIN AT WORK: BRAIN SCANS
THAT SPY ON THE SENSES, at http://www.hhmi.org/senses/e110 .html (last visited Feb. 19,
2005) (on file with the American University Law Review) (noting that PET scans are
similar to fMRIs in that they show brain activity, but that the newer fMRI does not require
the use of radioactive chemicals and presents images at higher resolution than the PET
scan).
108. Dr. Adrian Raine examined the PET scans of forty-one individuals convicted of
murder or manslaughter in the 1990s, separating the “predatory,” controlled killers from the
“affective,” emotionally impulsive killers. See Seiden, supra note 106, at 405-06 (citing
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between increased aggression and reduced prefrontal cortical size or
activity.”109 Further, this research suggests that frontal lobe deficits are
more commonly associated with “impulsive, rather than purposeful, violent
crimes.”110
Mental retardation also strongly impacts behavior, as a limitation in
intellectual functioning causes a decrease in adaptive behavior.111 Adaptive
behavior represents the interaction of personal, cognitive, social, and
situational variables and refers to the ability of a person to function
effectively in their social environment.112 Similar to adolescents, mentally
retarded persons typically understand the difference between right and
wrong, yet simply have a diminished capacity to engage in logical
reasoning, control impulses, and understand the reactions of others.113 It
has also been shown that a significant number of juveniles have displayed
impaired adjudicative competence to the same degree as the mentally ill.114
Adrian Raine et al., Brain Abnormalities in Murderers Indicated by Positron Emission
Tomography, 42 BIOLOGY & PSYCHIATRY 495 (1997)). The study revealed that the
“affective” group exhibited low pre-frontal activity, whereas the “predatory” killers’ frontal
lobe activity level was closer to that of the control group. Id. at 406. Dr. Raine concluded
that frontal lobe dysfunction may contribute to aggressive, emotionally charged behavior.
Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 405-06 (explaining that the frontal lobes are instrumental in regulating
socially appropriate behavior and suppressing impulses, so that in the case of underdeveloped or damaged frontal lobes, a person may lose the ability to control abnormal
impulses or drives, perhaps leading to criminal behavior).
111. See Douglas Mossman, M.D., Atkins v. Virginia: A Psychiatric Can of Worms, 33
N.M. L. REV. 255, 266 (2003) (explaining that the American Association on Mental
Retardation currently defines mental retardation as “a disability characterized by significant
limitations both in intellectual functioning and in adaptive behavior as expressed in
conceptual, social, and practical adaptive skills”).
112. Id. at 271; see also Fagan, supra note 13, at 219 (stating that a mentally retarded
person appears to “lack[] the logical reasoning skills, the maturity, and the ability to think in
long-range causal terms”).
113. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318 (2002) (stating that there is considerable
evidence that mentally retarded persons are generally very susceptible to peer pressure,
typically act as followers rather than leaders when in groups, and have trouble acting
pursuant to a plan and therefore tend to act impulsively); see also Victor L. Streib,
Adolescence, Mental Retardation, and the Death Penalty: The Siren Call of Atkins v.
Virginia, 33 N.M. L. REV. 183, 201 (detailing the Atkins Court’s discussion of the
psychological and behavioral characteristics of the mentally retarded). Streib explains that
Justice Scalia, in his dissent in Atkins, used the word “childlike” to refer to the mentally
retarded. Id. Streib indicates that where Justice Scalia simplistically described the mentally
retarded as having the mental maturity of a child, he effectively legitimated the connection
between cognitively immature juveniles and the mentally retarded. Id.
114. See Barry C. Feld, Competence, Culpability, and Punishment: Implications of
Atkins For Executing And Sentencing Adolescents, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 463, 525-26 (2003)
(quoting Thomas Grisso et al., Juveniles’ Competence to Stand Trial: A Comparison of
Adolescents’ and Adults’ Capacities as Trial Defendants, 27 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 333, 356
(2003)) (referencing one contemporary study reporting that “[a]pproximately one fifth of
14- to 15-year-olds are as impaired in capacities relevant to adjudicative competence as are
seriously mentally ill adults who would likely be considered incompetent to stand trial by
clinicians who perform evaluations for courts . . . . Not surprisingly, juveniles of belowaverage intelligence are more likely than juveniles of average intelligence to be impaired in
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It therefore appears that a limitation in adaptive behavior is not only
relevant to the crime committed by the offender, but that these limitations
concomitantly have substantial ramifications on the offender’s competency
to stand trial.
Although brains suffering from frontal lobe dysfunction and mental
retardation present more severe examples of the behavioral implications of
an under-developed or damaged pre-frontal cortex than those of adolescent
brains, there are some behavioral parallels between the groups.115 First,
adolescents’ frontal lobes exhibit limited cognitive activity in comparison
to those of normal adults.116 A pattern of limited cognitive activity is also
observed in people with frontal lobe damage, although those with damaged
or dysfunctional frontal lobes show limited feedback to a considerably
greater degree than adolescents.117 Lessened cognitive activity has been
shown to correspond with more aggressive, impulsive, and irrational
behavior.118 Such a result indicates that, while juveniles may not have the
degree of cognitive immaturity as that of mentally handicapped persons,
the parallels between these two groups further highlight the differences in
cognitive functioning that exist between juveniles and adults. Second,
although the mentally retarded exhibit limitations in adaptive behavior to a
greater degree than adolescents, research on adolescent cognition
demonstrates that adolescents also have trouble understanding the reactions
of others119 and engaging in logical reasoning,120 are more susceptible to
peer pressure,121 and act more impulsively122 than normally-functioning
abilities relevant for competence to stand trial. Because a greater proportion of youths in the
juvenile justice system than in the community are of below-average intelligence, the risk for
incompetence to stand trial is therefore even greater.”); see also Feld, supra, at 526 (stating
that “Atkins also found that mental retardation exposed defendants to the dangers of
erroneous convictions because of their greater susceptibility to interrogation techniques and
the concomitant dangers of false confessions.”).
115. See, e.g., Streib, supra note 113, at 215 (noting that the Atkins Court drew a
comparison between the mentally retarded and juveniles with regard to their common lack
of perspective and lower degree of moral culpability).
116. See Immature Brain Circuitry, supra note 77 (stating that in an adolescent brain, the
relative activation of the frontal regions is less than in that of an adult).
117. See Seiden, supra note 106, at 406 (noting that criminal subjects with considerably
low prefrontal activity—considered to have “frontal lobe deficits”— acted in a more
impulsive, less controlled manner).
118. See id. at 406 (citing M.C. Brower & B.H. Price, Neuropsychiatry of Frontal Lobe
Dysfunction in Violent and Criminal Behaviour: A Critical Review, 71 J. NEUROLOGICAL
NEUROSURGERY & PSYCHIATRY 720, 721 (2001)) (concluding that Dr. Raine’s study “shows
‘a strong association between increased aggression and reduced pre-frontal cortical size or
activity.’”).
119. See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
120. See, e.g., Interview with Dr. Jay Giedd, supra note 71 (“[In the teen years, this] part
of the brain that is helping organization, planning and strategizing is not done being built
yet . . . . It’s sort of unfair to expect [teens] to have adult levels of organizational skills or
decision making before their brain is finished being built.”).
121. See, e.g., Spear, supra note 82, at 111 (suggesting that adolescents’ increased
reliance on peer-directed social interactions may result from an instinctual response that
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adults. Third, research indicates that abnormal “pruning” of neurons in the
brain are associated with various neurodevelopmental disorders, including
mental retardation.123 Although not considered “abnormal,” an incomplete
pruning process is also observed in juvenile brains,124 and results in
inefficient reasoning capabilities in juveniles when compared with
adults.125
The Atkins Court held that executing the mentally retarded is
unconstitutional under a proportionality analysis as a result of this groups’
diminished reasoning capacity,126 and scientific studies are consistently
indicating that diminished reasoning capacity is associated with
underdeveloped frontal regions of the brain.127 In light of Atkins, it appears
that a judicial determination on the constitutionality of the death penalty
would be incomplete without consideration of current psychological
research on brain maturation that suggests that juveniles also typically have
diminished reasoning capacity and share some behavioral and cognitive
commonalities with the mentally handicapped.
III. STANDARDS OF DECENCY HAVE EVOLVED TO THE POINT WHERE
JUVENILE CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IS CRUEL AND UNUSUAL UNDER THE
EIGHTH AMENDMENT
Having examined the current psychological research on juvenile brain
development, it is now possible to incorporate this empirical research into
the Atkins v. Virginia framework and apply the Court’s reasoning to
juveniles.

provides for the opportunity to practice and model adult behavior patterns).
122. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
123. See Frances J. Lexcen & N. Dickon Reppucci, Effects of Psychopathology on
Adolescent Medical Decision-Making, 5 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 63, 80 (1998)
(reporting that hyperdensities of neurons are associated with mental retardation).
124. See Wallis, supra note 6, at 59 (explaining that the pruning of gray matter begins in
the late teens and does not completely taper off until the early twenties, at which point the
brain has fewer but faster neuronal connections).
125. Id.
126. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002) (indicating that the death penalty
is the most extreme form of punishment and that the average murderer does not possess the
culpability deemed necessary to justify this extreme sanction). Therefore, the Atkins Court
concluded that the substantially diminished culpability of a mentally retarded offender
makes the death penalty for such an offender excessive, thus violating the Eighth
Amendment. Id.
127. See, e.g., Giedd et al., supra note 66, at 861 (explaining that gray and white matter
in the brain may be developing well into adulthood); Immature Brain Circuitry, supra note
77 (establishing that adolescents rely more heavily on the amygdala and less on the prefrontal cortex, leading to less reasoned thought, especially in stressful situations).
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A. Developing A National Consensus: Looking Beyond Capital
Punishment Legislation to Minimum Age Statutes
Adolescents experience a coming of age in American society upon
turning eighteen. Although some states allow juveniles to acquire full
driving privileges at sixteen, youths acquire most of their rights, such as the
right to vote, marry, enter the military, make contracts, purchase cigarettes,
and make medical decisions at the age of eighteen.128 Over the last 350
years in America, society has struggled to define the age at which children
become adults and consequently attain full membership in the
community.129 Yet since the 1970s, many age restrictions have been
implemented, or extended to a higher age, as American society becomes
more protective of its youth.130 In upholding the death penalty for sixteenand seventeen-year-olds, the Stanford v. Kentucky Court stressed that
standards of decency should be determined by a “national consensus.”131
But as society implements more legislation to limit the freedom of the
nation’s youth, can it simultaneously intend to enforce the most severe
criminal sanction available in this country against sixteen- and seventeenyear-old children? These positions are incompatible.
Over the past century, a paternalistic national consensus has developed;
one that has moved toward expanding minimum age statutes that restrict
the age at which youths can exercise various rights. For example, the
introduction of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938132 set safety
requirements for youths under the age of eighteen and made fourteen the
minimum age for employment. Similarly, the National Minimum Drinking

128. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1 (establishing the minimum voting age at
eighteen); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (upholding states’ right to restrict marriage
involving juveniles); Bramley’s Water Conditioning v. Hagen, No. 1503, 1985 WL 303824,
at *2 (11th Cir. June 21, 1985) (refusing to enforce a contract with a person under the age of
eighteen).
129. See HINE, supra note 16, at 45 (explaining that American society, during the 1960s
and 1970s, seemed to be standardizing legal adulthood at eighteen years of age, but since
then have extended some restrictions to age twenty-one).
130. See id. (offering juvenile curfews as an example of legislation that has been
reintroduced over the past two decades).
131. The Court’s interpretation of “national consensus” has changed over time. For
example, in Stanford, Justice Scalia concluded that the national consensus is determined
virtually entirely by legislation, and proposed that the inquiry begins by determining how
many states permit capital punishment in general. 492 U.S. 361, 371 (1989). Justice Scalia
found that of states that permit the death penalty, where more states also permit the sanction
for juveniles than refuse to impose it upon juveniles, then the national consensus supports
juvenile capital punishment. Id. In Atkins, however, Justice Stevens defined “national
consensus” more broadly and considered jury behavior and other indicators of public
opinion to carry more weight than they were accorded in Stanford. 536 U.S. at 315 n.21.
132. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 212 (1938) (defining “oppressive child labor” as the employment
of a child under the age of sixteen or the employment of a child between the ages of sixteen
and eighteen in a “hazardous” job that is detrimental to the child’s health or well-being).
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Age Act of 1984133 set the national drinking age at twenty-one (up from
eighteen in most states). Furthermore, the graduated licensing policy,
designed to reduce the crash risk among teenagers, is a recent example of
the longstanding legislative movement toward protecting juveniles in the
United States.134 Professionals in the transportation safety field explain
that immaturity is a factor in the high crash risk for sixteen-year-olds,
manifesting itself in poor judgment and high risk-taking behavior.135
Accordingly, the idea behind graduated licensing is to reduce the crash risk
for new drivers by delaying full-licensing privileges until the age of
eighteen.136 This theory is supported by psychological data that shows that
reasoning, memory and attention processes, and problem solving abilities
are not completely developed until around eighteen or nineteen years of
age.137
Taking the example of licensing, where the initial age requirements to
obtain a driver’s license were based on cultural mores and politics rather
than cognitive science,138 it becomes apparent that looking purely to
national culture and public opinion may be an incomplete process for
setting age limits for juveniles to exercise certain rights.139 Moreover, it
appears that a concern about adolescent maturity and judgment has driven
the transportation safety field to look to psychological analyses to
supplement crash statistics in an effort to make a more reliable
determination about the ability of juveniles to drive safely.140 This
133. 23 U.S.C. § 158 (1984).
134. See ALLAN F. WILLIAMS, INSURANCE INSTITUTE FOR HIGHWAY SAFETY, GRADUATED
LICENSING IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (2000) (explaining that, since the mid-1990s, graduated
licensing is an increasingly popular concept in the United States and Canada and involves a
gradual phasing-in approach to gaining on-road driving privileges). In this system, a new
driver has a period of supervised-only driving, followed by a restrictive stage where drivers
may not be allowed to drive at night or with passengers, and progresses to an unsupervised
stage when no crashes or violations have been sustained during this introductory period. Id.
135. Ferguson, supra note 76, at 72.
136. See WILLIAMS, supra note 134, at 3-6 (reasoning that the high-risk ages for new
drivers are sixteen and seventeen, and documenting that countries and states that have
implemented a graduated licensing program have significantly decreased their crash rates
for novice drivers).
137. See DAVID W. EBY & LISA J. MOLNAR, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN TRANSPORTATION
RESEARCH INSTITUTE, MATCHING TRAFFIC SAFETY STRATEGIES TO YOUTH CHARACTERISTICS:
A LITERATURE REVIEW OF COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT xi-xiv (referring to the ability of youths
to reason by analogy, think about more than one problem simultaneously, and think about
relationships among multiple events in a bidirectional way).
138. See generally DANIEL R. MAYHEW ET AL INSURANCE INSTITUTE FOR HIGHWAY
SAFETY, WHY 16? (2000) (addressing the origins of the age requirement for driver’s licenses
throughout the United States and abroad).
139. Cf. Paul Raeburn, Idea Lab: Too Immature for the Death Penalty?, N.Y. TIMES
MAG., Oct. 17, 2004, at 26 (quoting Dr. Jay Giedd) (“The old idea was that adolescence was
a social phenomenon, not biological . . . . [M]aybe it’s not social, maybe there is actual
biology to explain why a lot of cultures have put age limits on things.”).
140. See EBY & MOLNAR, supra note 137, at viii (stating that the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) began a program that was designed to understand
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inclusive approach of looking to popular opinion, culture, and science
shows that seventeen or eighteen years of age is a more appropriate age to
obtain full licensing privileges, and this conclusion is echoed by most other
countries outside of the United States and Canada.141
If society, state and federal legislatures, and professional organizations
employ a multi-lateral approach—one that includes neurobiological and
behavioral science—to determine the age at which juveniles are mature
enough to handle privileges and constitutionally guaranteed rights, such an
inclusive approach is only appropriate when the Roper v. Simmons Court
determines the current state of a national consensus regarding juvenile
capital punishment. Although Justice Scalia’s view in Stanford—that age
statutes are irrelevant to the death penalty debate—may be valid,142 the
move away from the traditional, younger ages for privileges such as driving
toward higher age requirements signals a clear shift in public opinion
toward greater protection for juveniles.143 Notwithstanding the argument
that minimum age statutes themselves may not be dispositive of the issue
of juvenile capital punishment, the statutes indicate that both the legislature
and the public are increasingly making judgments about the age at which
youths are mature enough to handle responsibility. This trend is validated,
not only by common sense that adolescents are not psychologically mature,
but also by psychological and behavioral data on juvenile cognitive
maturity.144 The consideration of empirical evidence should therefore be
the factors related to the high crash rates for drivers under the age of twenty-five). NHTSA
recognized that mental factors, such as memory and risk perception, likely played a role in
juveniles’ driving ability. Id.
141. See MAYHEW, supra note 138, at 17-18 (mentioning that licensing ages are typically
a year or two older in Australia and Europe).
142. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 374-75 (1989) (contending that age
statutes for activities such as voting and drinking alcohol are not pertinent to the
constitutionality of the juvenile death penalty because they represent only a social judgment
that the vast majority of youths are not responsible enough to partake in these activities, not
that all youths are not responsible enough). But see Transcript of Oral Argument, Roper v.
Simmons, No. 03-633, at 5 (U.S. Oct. 13, 1004) (questioning the logic in the assertion that a
youth can be death eligible but not a member of the adult community), available at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov
/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/03-633.pdf;
Stanford, 492 U.S. at 382 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (proposing that the Court has an
obligation to conduct a proportionality analysis, which appropriately calls for incorporating
minimum-age statutes into Eighth Amendment considerations).
143. The idea that juveniles can be protected by greater age restrictions and that these
restrictions are related to the juvenile death penalty debate is not a new one. See Thompson
v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835 (1988) (“The reasons why juveniles are not trusted with the
privileges and responsibilities of an adult also explain why their irresponsible conduct is not
as morally reprehensible as that of an adult.”); see also Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104,
115-16 (1982) (“Our history is replete with laws and judicial recognition that minors . . .
generally are less mature and responsible than adults.”).
144. HINE, supra note 16, at 45; see also Transcript of Oral Argument, Roper v.
Simmons, No. 03-633, at 40 (U.S. Oct. 13, 2004) (explaining that the science presented in
Mr. Simmons’ brief in Roper confirms what common sense already knows—that juveniles
are
mentally
less
mature
than
adults),
available
at
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considered in Roper as “objective indicia that reflect the public attitude
toward a given sanction,”145 because the juvenile death penalty is an
anomaly in our legislative system and it would be counterintuitive, in light
of the recent studies on brain maturity and the societal trend towards
protecting juveniles until the age of eighteen, not to appreciate that the
national consensus on many juvenile justice issues is shifting.
To further bolster the view that a national consensus is shifting with
regard to juvenile executions, one need only look to recent polls on the
issue. Although public opinion polls are not considered a primary indicator
of a national consensus,146 the Atkins Court did look to polls to reinforce its
decision that a national consensus had formed against the execution of the
mentally retarded.147 A similar consensus is forming against juvenile
executions. A 2001 study found that, while sixty-two percent of Americans
support the death penalty in general, only thirty-four percent favor it for
juveniles under the age of eighteen.148 A May 2002 Gallup poll also
showed that sixty-nine percent of Americans oppose executing juveniles.149
Because the public’s common-sense disapproval of this practice, as
reflected in opinion polls, has been empirically validated, it is no longer the
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/03-633.pdf (on file
with the American University Law Review).
145. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (concluding that the Court must
assess objective “contemporary values” in order to apply the Eighth Amendment
requirements to the challenged sanction). The Gregg Court noted that public perception is
one objective index relevant to the determination of “contemporary values.” Id. While
legislative judgment is heavily weighted when ascertaining these values, because the courts
act as a limit on legislative power, it is not the only inquiry that the Court must undertake.
Id. at 175, 179. “[The] penalty must also accord with ‘the dignity of man,’ which is the
‘basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment.’” Id. at 173. Further, the Court must
consider the proportionality of the punishment, which requires it to make an independent
analysis of the inherent humanity of the death penalty for the group of offenders involved to
ensure it is not excessive in nature. Id.
Once the Court looks at the state legislative response to the juvenile death penalty, the
additional “objective indicia” discussed above call for the incorporation of science and
professional opinion into the framework; first, to guide the definition of “human dignity,”
and second, to determine if the punishment is in fact proportional for a group that has been
recognized as less morally and legally culpable by a number of Supreme Court Justices. In
re Stanford, 537 U.S. 968 (2002).
146. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 315-16 (2002) (stating that consistency in
legislation between many States is “powerful evidence” of consensus).
147. See id. at 317 n.21 (noting that “polling data shows a widespread consensus among
Americans, even those who support the death penalty, that executing the mentally retarded
is wrong.”).
148. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, JUVENILE JUSTICE CENTER, EVOLVING
STANDARDS OF DECENCY—CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT: THE JUVENILE DEATH
PENALTY 3 (Jan. 2004) (citing a University of Chicago study), available at
http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/juvjus/resources.html. A similar study by Princeton Survey
Research Associates showed that while seventy-two percent of Americans favored the death
penalty, only thirty-eight percent thought that it should be applied to juveniles. Id.
149. See id. (indicating that this level of opposition has remained constant for seventy
years); see also Marshall, supra note 5, at 2927-28 (“[E]vidence of the American public’s
opinion of the practice [of executing juveniles] shows overwhelming disapproval.”).
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“uncertain foundation” Justice Scalia admonished in Stanford.150 These
polls demonstrate that legislation on the issue of juvenile capital
punishment does not sufficiently reflect the current national consensus.
Therefore, further objective indicators of the national consensus, namely
scientific data on cognitive development, should be considered by the
Court under the “evolving standards of decency” framework.151
B. Defining “Evolving Standards of Decency” in the Wake of Atkins:
Moving Away from Legislative and Jury Behavior to Focus on a
Comprehensive “Societal” View of Juvenile Capital Punishment
The Supreme Court, over the past few years, appears to be making a
push to redefine “society.” It is important to consider the current definition
of society when discussing the juvenile death penalty, because the language
of Thompson v. Oklahoma, Stanford, and Atkins rests heavily on a
conception of society’s standard of decency.152 Whereas Justice Scalia, in
his majority opinion in Stanford, focused solely on American conceptions
of decency,153 he departed from the Trop v. Dulles Court, which clearly
used international law to guide its interpretation of what constitutes cruel
and unusual punishment.154 Justice Stevens and the majority in Atkins also
disagreed with Justice Scalia, looking to the world to shape human
standards of decency more generally.155 In contrast to the United States,
the international society overwhelmingly condemns the practice of juvenile
execution,156 with countries reasoning that the punishment is
disproportionate in light of the diminished mental maturity of juveniles.157
150. See 492 U.S. 361, 377 (1989).
151. See discussion infra Part IV.D (addressing the lag between the national consensus
and individual states’ legislative response, particularly the need for the court to step in
where the democratic process is moving too slowly in order to remedy fundamental rights
violations).
152. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 (establishing that “today our society views mentally
retarded offenders as categorically less culpable than the average criminal.”); Stanford, 492
U.S. at 369 (reiterating that the court must look not to its own standard of decency, but
rather the standards of “modern American society as a whole”) (emphasis added);
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 821 (1988) (holding that standards are not static, but
measured by the progress of a “maturing society”).
153. See 492 U.S. at 369 n.1 (finding that the juvenile sentencing practices of other
nations are irrelevant to an interpretation of the Eighth Amendment).
154. See 356 U.S. 86, 102-03 (1958) (considering the dearth of countries that imposed
expatriation when declaring the punishment unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment).
155. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316-17 n.21 (considering international opinion, most notably
that of the Western European community, in determining that there is a widespread
consensus against executing the mentally retarded).
156. See infra note 169 and accompanying text.
157. See Brief of Amici Curiae Human Rights Committee of the Bar of England and
Wales et al. at 11, Roper v. Simmons, 540 U.S. 1160 (2004) (No. 03-633) [hereinafter
British Brief] (“[T]he emotional balance of young people under the age of 21 is unstable,
and this instability reduces their responsibility, and that the instability of adolescents, which
in some cases may even amount to a form of mental disorder is very often a factor in the
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A broader outlook that considers the practices of the international
community has indeed been a trend in recent Supreme Court opinions
evaluating individual rights’ issues. In 1997, for example, in his dissent in
Printz v. United States,158 Justice Breyer called for the Court to consider the
values of European federalism when attempting to define the relationship
between the federal government and state officials.159 In 2003, Justice
Ginsburg wrote a concurring opinion in Grutter v. Bollinger160 citing the
practices of the international community in supporting the tailored use of
race in university admissions.161 Three days later, in Lawrence v. Texas,162
Justice Kennedy drew from British Parliamentary law and the European
Convention on Human Rights to strike down a Texas law prohibiting
sodomy.163 It seems apparent that certain members of the current Court are
willing to define “society” as a broader, international community, in which
the United States looks to the practices and opinions of other countries
when determining human rights matters.164
The subject of international opinion is extremely topical on the eve of
the Supreme Court’s decision in Roper. On July 19, 2004, eighteen Nobel
Prize Winners, twenty-eight religious groups, and forty-eight nations, along
with the American Medical Association (“AMA”) and various other health
organizations, lobbied the Court to end the practice of executing juveniles
who were sentenced under the age of eighteen.165 World nations argued
that imposing execution on juveniles “violates widely accepted human
rights norms and the minimum standards of human rights set forth by the

crime.”) (emphasis added) (quoting Report of the Select Committee on Capital Punishment
at ¶ 193 (1930)(U.K.)).
158. 521 U.S. 898, 976-78 (1997).
159. See id. at 976-77 (maintaining that although the Court is interpreting the
Constitution of the United States and not of another nation, the experiences of other
countries may offer different solutions to the same legal problem).
160. 539 U.S. 306, 344-46 (2003).
161. See id. at 344 (providing that the Court’s ruling on race-conscious programs accords
with the international understanding of affirmative action, and referring specifically to the
policy of The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination).
162. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
163. See id. at 573 (examining a case in Northern Ireland heard by the European Court of
Human Rights five years prior to Lawrence, which had factual parallels to the Lawrence
case).
164. The identity of the Justices who have adopted this viewpoint in the foregoing cases
(Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Stevens, Kennedy, and Souter) may be significant when the
Court hears Roper, as they are five of the six Justices who voted to put an end to the practice
of executing the mentally retarded. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). Missing
only Justice Kennedy, the other four Justices voted to hear In re Stanford and wrote a
scathing opinion condemning the use of the juvenile death penalty. 537 U.S. 968 (2002).
165. See Alan Cooperman, High Court Asked to End Execution of Minors, WASH. POST,
July 20, 2004, at A1 (mentioning that these groups contend that the practice of executing
juveniles violates “minimum standards of decency shared by virtually every nation in the
world.”).
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United Nations.”166 In submitting amicus briefs to the Court for
consideration in Roper, some countries stressed the scientific research on
mental maturity, advocating that it demonstrates that juveniles are less
cognitively mature than adults in their early twenties.167
It is important for the Court to recognize that the United States is the
only country in the world that still “legally” executes juveniles, because it
is the sole recognized government that has refused to ratify Article 37(a) of
the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child,168 which
prohibits capital punishment for persons under the age of eighteen.169 The
AMA, lobbying with these nations, submitted an amicus brief to the
Supreme Court that specifically cited recent psychological research in
support of its condemnation of the practice.170 This brief echoed the
166. Anne Gearan, High Court Asked to End Child Executions, July 19, 2004, available
at
http://groups.msn.com/GlobalAffairs/deathpenalty.msnw?action=get_message&
mview=0&ID_Message=47613&LastModified=4675481530391838234.
167. See British Brief, supra note 157, at 11 (pinpointing twenty-one as the most
accurate cut-off age to distinguish between adults and juveniles).
168. See United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N.
GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, art. 37, U.N. Doc. A/44/736 (1989) [hereinafter Article
37(a)] (providing that countries shall ensure that “[n]o child shall be subjected to torture or
other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Neither capital punishment nor
life imprisonment without possibility of release shall be imposed for offences committed by
persons below eighteen years of age”).
169. See Victor L. Streib, The Juvenile Death Penalty Today: Death Sentences and
Executions for Juvenile Crimes, January 1, 1973—April 30, 2004 8 (last modified May 4,
2004) (observing that a few juvenile executions have occurred in other countries outside of
the United States over the past decade, but that these executions were illegal in those
countries
at
the
time
that
they
occurred),
available
at
http://www.law.onu.edu/faculty/streib/JuvDeathApr302004.pdf.
Streib notes that the
practice is not sanctioned by the government in any of the countries that have ratified
Article 37(a), nor were those incidents considered to be a rejection of the international
agreements. Id. See also Gearan, supra note 166 (stating that only five countries have
executed juveniles in the past four years—Congo, China, Iran, Pakistan, and the United
States—but that the United States has executed more juveniles than these four countries
combined since 1990); UNICEF, THE CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD:
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, at http://www.unicef.org/crc/faq.htm#009 (last visited Feb.
19, 2004) (on file with the American University Law Review) (mentioning that Somalia is
the only other country that has not ratified the United Nation’s Convention on the Rights of
the Child, but that they cannot do so because they have no recognized government).
170. See generally AMA Brief, supra note 87, at 3-4 (citing fifty-eight scientific
authorities that, together, establish the proposition that the adolescent brain does not reach a
state of maturity until at least the age of eighteen and that the juvenile brain exhibits
deficiencies that the Court, in Atkins, has already determined warrant exclusion from the
death penalty). “Adolescents as a group, even at the age of 16 or 17, are more impulsive
than adults. They underestimate risks and overvalue short-term benefits. They are more
susceptible to stress, more emotionally volatile, and less capable of controlling their
emotions than adults.” Id. at 2. See also AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION HOUSE OF
DELEGATES, AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION HOUSE OF DELEGATES RESOLUTION 10 (A04) AGAINST JUVENILE DEATH SENTENCES (May 5, 2004) (referring to psychological studies
that have shown that adolescents are cognitively and emotionally less mature than adults),
available at http:// www.phrusa.org/campaigns/juv_justice/lewis_study.html. Specifically,
the AMA reports that myelination is not complete until after adolescence, MRIs have
indicated that adolescents’ brains function in fundamentally different ways than adults’
brains, and adolescents are more likely to rely on the amygdala than the pre-frontal cortex,
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opinions of numerous major medical and scientific organizations in arguing
that juvenile execution does not serve either recognized goal of the death
penalty— deterrence or retribution.171 Various religious organizations
joined this lobby, stressing that there is a strong consensus among religious
organizations around the world that the practice of juvenile execution is
contrary to any society’s standard of decency.172
While a survey of international opinion may not be appropriate in every
instance,173 following Printz, Grutter, and Lawrence, Supreme Court
jurisprudence allows for an extension in the scope of the analysis when
appropriate. An analysis that considers international opinion is appropriate

resulting in more impulsive behavior. Id.
171. See AMA Brief, supra note 87, at 22 (arguing that juveniles do not typically act
with the “cold calculus” of an adult murderer—for which the most severe societal sanction
is reserved—as a result of their immature reasoning capabilities, and that Atkins precluded
the death penalty where such a “calculus” is not present).
Because the Court found, in Atkins v. Virginia, that deterrence and retribution are the two
intended social purposes served by the death penalty, capital punishment for juveniles must
measurably contribute to one of these goals. With regard to the first goal, there is no
evidence that executing juveniles deters youth from committing crime because there is little
certainty that a capital offense committed by a juvenile will be punished by execution. See
Lawrence A. Vanore, The Decency of Capital Punishment for Minors: Contemporary
Standards and the Dignity of Juveniles, 61 IND. L.J. 757, 790 (1986) (explaining that
prosecutors are unlikely to seek the death penalty, juries are reluctant to impose the
punishment on youth, and courts often overturn death penalty sentences, contributing to the
uncertainty of the consequence). But see Warren M. Kato, The Juvenile Death Penalty, 18
J. JUV. L. 112, 137 (1997) (claiming that the Thompson Court majority failed to objectively
inquire into whether the death penalty served the goals of retribution and deterrence, instead
relying on their own subjective beliefs about the punishment).
Further, even if adolescents are aware that the death penalty is a consequence of
committing first-degree murder, their lack of skill at evaluating consequences and planning
for the future indicate that capital punishment is still unlikely to adequately deter youth from
criminal behavior. See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text (describing diminished
decision-making capacity of adolescents, when compared to adults).
The second purpose of the death penalty is retribution—a channel for society to express
its moral outrage at crime and the criminal. Vanore, supra, at 787. Since Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153 (1976), Supreme Court death penalty jurisprudence has consistently confined
this punishment to the most serious crimes and the most depraved criminals. Vanore, supra,
at 787. According to recent empirical evidence, legislative intent, and social and
professional consensus, it appears as if the overwhelming consensus is that juveniles are not
as legally or morally culpable as adults in most cases, and therefore do not warrant the most
extreme sanction available. See id. at 788 (“[J]uvenile murderers are always less
responsible for their actions, and are less morally blameworthy, than adult murderers”). In
the case of diminished moral blameworthiness, the second goal of punishment is thus also
not achieved, lending to the disproportional nature of the punishment.
172. See Cooperman, supra note 165 (citing Mark Chopko, general counsel to the U.S.
Conference of Catholic Bishops, as asserting that all major religions accept that juveniles
have less moral culpability than adults).
173. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Roper v. Simmons, No. 03-633, at 27 (U.S. Oct.
13, 2004) (questioning whether the Supreme Court should adopt a new rule that the United
States should follow world governments on all constitutional questions, specifically asking
if the trial by jury requirement should cease because other world governments do not
institute
the
practice),
available
at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/03-633.pdf.
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in Roper because this issue is one of “human dignity,”174 which is different
from other issues of consensus, such as trial by jury.175 Accordingly, the
trend toward looking to the world on constitutional issues of individual
rights is gaining support from the Court and should play a role in shaping
death penalty jurisprudence.176 Consequently, while Justice Scalia defines
“society” as a national concept, scientific studies of cognitive development
provide tangible evidence that is appreciated across cultural and geographic
boundaries.177 Scientific studies examining the adolescent brain should
therefore serve to bridge national and international opinion that capital
punishment for juveniles is inhumane by centering the discussion, not
around ideological and political norms, but instead around a common
human biology.
C. Re-evaluating the State Legislative Response: What Has Changed
Since Stanford and Why?
Stanford determined that when assessing “evolving standards of
decency,” state statutes passed by society’s democratically elected
representatives should be the primary objective indicia to which the Court
turns.178 In 1989, the Court noted that, of the thirty-seven states that
allowed for capital punishment, fifteen did not permit the execution of
juveniles aged sixteen years and younger, and twelve did not permit the
punishment for seventeen-year-old offenders.179
It appears that much has changed since Stanford, as the threshold at
174. See supra note 145 and accompanying text (discussing the factors that make up the
death penalty analysis).
175. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Roper v. Simmons, No. 03-633, at 27 (U.S. Oct.
13, 2004) (advocating that the Roper Court consider the international community’s
disapproval of the juvenile death penalty when determining the constitutionality of the
practice),
available
at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_
arguments/argument_transcripts/03-633.pdf; see also supra note 173.
176. See supra notes 157-162 and accompanying text (explaining that in three recent
cases, Justices have filed opinions that include some reference to international norms).
177. See Letter from Human Rights Watch, to New Hampshire Governor, Craig Benson
(April 28, 2004) (noting that customary international law prohibits juvenile executions and
explaining that this standard reflects the understanding that “children are different from
adults; that they lack the experience, judgment, maturity, and restraint of an adult. . . .”),
available at http://www.hrw.org/english /docs/2004/04/28/usdom8508.htm.
178. 492 U.S. 361, 370 (1989).
179. Id. The Court concluded that because a majority of the states that allow for capital
punishment do permit the execution of juveniles, the level of national consensus necessary
to label the practice of executing juveniles cruel and unusual was not met. Id. at 371. In
support, the Court cited the following cases, among others: Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584
(1977), abolishing the death penalty for cases of rape when Georgia was the only state that
continued to permit such a punishment; Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982), striking
down the use of the death penalty for offenders who participate in a robbery where an
accomplice kills someone, when only eight states authorized such a punishment; Tison v.
Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987), upholding the execution of offenders involved in a felony
where the person exhibited reckless indifference to human life when only eleven
jurisdictions that permitted capital punishment rejected its use in such a case.
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which the Court finds a national consensus sufficient to declare a practice
cruel and unusual has shifted over the past two years.180 Even if the
standard had still remained the same as it was presented in Stanford,
however, there has been a decisive legislative shift away from permitting
juvenile capital punishment. Since Stanford, eight states have implemented
legislation banning the execution of juveniles or have construed their
capital punishment statutes to prohibit this practice.181 No states have
implemented legislation that would lower the acceptable age for imposing
execution from eighteen to sixteen or seventeen.182 Further, the New
Hampshire legislature overwhelmingly passed a bill to raise the minimum
age for capital punishment to eighteen, only to have it vetoed by the
governor.183 Similar bills are pending in Alabama and Florida.184
Therefore, of the thirty-seven states that permitted the death penalty in the
age of Stanford, only twelve explicitly banned juvenile executions for
sixteen- and seventeen-year olds, whereas today, nineteen of those states
expressly prohibit the practice.185 The Atkins Court found that eighteen
state legislatures had expressly prohibited the practice of executing the
mentally retarded and determined that this number was a sufficient basis to
indicate a national consensus against this practice and strike it down as
cruel and unusual.186 Taking the twelve states that oppose the death penalty
for all persons (not including the District of Columbia, and federal and
civilian military courts),187 and the nineteen states that prohibit juvenile
executions while retaining the punishment for adults, there are a total of
180. Compare Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 315 (2002) (“It is not so much the
number of these States that is significant, but the consistency of the direction of change”),
with Stanford, 492 U.S. at 370 (determining that there is not the national consensus
necessary to label the death penalty cruel and unusual where, of thirty-seven states that
permit capital punishment, fifteen decline to impose it on sixteen-year-old offenders and
twelve decline to impose it on seventeen-year-old offenders).
181. Indiana (IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-3(b)(2) (Michie 2002)); Kansas (KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 21-4622) (1995)); Missouri (Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397 (Mo. 2003) (en
banc)); Montana (MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-102(2) (2001)); New York (N.Y. PENAL LAW §
125.27(1)(b) (McKinney Supp. 2002)); South Dakota (S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-42
(Michie 2004); Washington (Washington v. Furman, 858 P.2d 1092 (1993)); Wyoming
(WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-101(b) (Michie 2004)).
182. Simmons, 112 S.W.3d at 408 (citations omitted).
183. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, US: NEW HAMPSHIRE GOVERNOR VETOES ANTI-DEATH
PENALTY
MEASURE,
at
http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/deathpenalty/docs/
update051104.htm (last updated May 11, 2004) (on file with the American University Law
Review).
184. Streib, supra note 169, at 7.
185. California, Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Maryland, Missouri,
Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oregon, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Washington, and Wyoming. See supra note 58 (listing the fifteen state statutes
and one state supreme court decision that prohibited the juvenile death penalty at the time of
the Simmons decision); see also supra note 181 (listing states that have recently banned the
practice).
186. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 314-16.
187. See supra note 59 (listing the twelve states that do not permit the death penalty).
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thirty-one states that do not permit the death penalty for juveniles. Again,
the Atkins Court found that where thirty states opposed a practice, there
was a sufficient national consensus to declare the practice unconstitutional.
When analyzing this considerable shift in legislative treatment regarding
juvenile capital punishment, the analysis must necessarily include a
discussion of scientific research on brain maturity because states have
considered such psychological data when determining whether to change
their juvenile execution laws.188 The significant legislative response
indicates that despite the definition of “society” that the current Court
chooses to adopt with respect to capital punishment, the practice should
nevertheless be void because a clear national consensus, based on state
legislation, has developed against executing juveniles. The Court would
therefore be remiss if it omitted from its constitutional analysis the
considerable scientific evidence that signals that juveniles have diminished
mental capacity in comparison to adults because this evidence played an
important role in changing the perspective of state legislatures.
D. Problems With Stanford’s Predominantly Legislative Approach:
History Indicates that State Counting is Not Always an Appropriate
Response to Human Rights Issues
The Supreme Court is responsible for protecting fundamental rights,
despite the status of public opinion and the tally of state statutes,189 and has
embraced that role where necessary to protect such rights.190 Justice
Scalia’s point in Stanford is well taken—that the democratic process is
designed to effectuate the will of the people so that the people shall
188. See, e.g., Dan Tuohy, Juvenile Death Penalty Under Scrutiny, EAGLE TRIB. ONLINE,
Feb. 10, 2004, at http://www.eagletribune.com/news/stories/20040210/NH _006.htm (on
file with the American University Law Review) (mentioning that Dr. David Fassler, an
associate professor of clinical psychiatry, testified in support of the change in the New
Hampshire death penalty statute that adolescents have a much more limited understanding
of the rational world than adults).
189. See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943) (“The
very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of
political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to
establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One’s right to life, liberty, and
property . . . and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the
outcome of no elections.”); see also id. at 640 (“[Despite] expanded and strengthened
governmental controls, we cannot, because of modest estimates of our competence . . .
withhold the judgment that history authenticates as the function of this Court when liberty is
infringed.”).
190. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (holding that antimiscegenation
statutes are in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment because they abridge the freedom to
marry, one of the “basic civil rights of man”); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493
(1954) (overturning “separate but equal” jurisprudence on account of the fact each person
has an absolute right to equal treatment under the law, regardless of race, and that education
must therefore be made available to all people on equal terms). Despite popular opinion, the
Court announced that segregation was therefore no longer permissible under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id.
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determine their particular state’s policy through their individual state’s
legislature.191 The Court in Gregg v. Georgia, however, held that the
Eighth Amendment is a “restraint on the exercise of legislative power.”192
More importantly, the Supremacy Clause precludes state legislatures from
completely branching out on their own and independently determining the
full scope of the legislation that their states will enact.193 Such laws still
must comport with the Constitution, and it is within the jurisdiction of the
United States Supreme Court to determine if a law is constitutional.194
Therefore, the Constitution was not designed to reflect public opinion in
every instance; rather, the Framers of the Constitution implemented a
checks-and-balances system, whereby the Supreme Court could sidestep a
“tyrannical majority.”195
The right to life is a fundamental right that may not be abridged by the
will of the people.196 As a result, the government may not take a person’s
life without due process of law.197 The Supreme Court held that due
process of law is present for juvenile capital punishment when there is a
national consensus accepting the sanction198 and when the punishment is
proportional to the severity of the crime.199 Under Stanford, and the
“evolving standards of decency” test, such a national consensus is
determined primarily by the count of state legislatures that approve of the
practice.200 The second factor, proportionality, requires that, for a
191. 492 U.S. 361, 370-73 (1989).
192. 428 U.S. 153, 174 (1976). The Court explained the role of the judiciary as a
backstop to protect against unconstitutional punishments, even if approved by elected
legislatures. Id. at 174-75.
193. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“Laws of the United States . . . shall be the Supreme Law
of the Land; and . . . any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.”).
194. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177-78 (1803).
195. See Marshall, supra note 5, at 2924-25 (“Without an independent [judicial] analysis
by an independent body, exclusive reliance on state counting leads to an ‘empty
constitutional standard,’ as it effectively ‘hands back to the very majorities the Framers
distrusted the power to define the precise scope of protection afforded by the Bill of
Rights.’”) (quoting Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 391-92 (1989) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting)).
196. See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (establishing
that the right to life, liberty, property, free speech, free press, freedom of worship and
assembly are fundamental human rights and are thus placed beyond the reach of majorities,
in striking down a state requirement for school children to salute the American flag).
197. U.S. CONST. amend. V. See generally Steven H. Jupiter, Comment, Constitution
Notwithstanding: The Political Illegitimacy of the Death Penalty in American Democracy,
23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 437 (1996) (reviewing the constitutional limitations of the
government’s right to take a life under the due process clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments and examining Eighth Amendment jurisprudence).
198. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 370-71 (1989).
199. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (holding that a punishment cannot be
excessive under the Eighth Amendment). The excessiveness inquiry requires that the
punishment be proportional to the severity of the crime, and that no unnecessary and wanton
pain be inflicted on the person. Id.
200. 492 U.S. at 370-71 (stating that courts consider statutes passed by society’s elected
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punishment to comport with the Eighth Amendment, it be measured not
only by the amount of harm caused by the offender, but also by the
offender’s blameworthiness.201 Science is vital to an understanding of what
is proportional because culpability is reduced when an offender can negate
the assumption that the offense is derived from bad character202 by
demonstrating that the offense resulted, at least in part, from diminished
cognitive maturity.203
In the event that the current Court determines that state counting has still
not met the level of a “national consensus” that was prescribed in Stanford,
the Court should nevertheless find the practice of executing juveniles
unconstitutional because “the People” may not always be entrusted to
singularly determine the meaning of “due process of law.”204 In Brown v.
Bd. of Educ.205 and Loving v. Virginia,206 the Court protected the
fundamental rights of equality and marriage, respectively, despite public
opinion on the matter.207
Like the right to marry and the right to equality under the law, the right
to life must be protected by the Court. Even if the Court determines that
legislative behavior regarding capital punishment for juveniles has not
reached the level of a national consensus, it should ensure that the
punishment does not deny the fundamental right to life. Because the

representatives as the primary objective indicia that determine the public’s view of any
given sanction).
201. See Scott & Steinberg, supra note 15, at 800 (addressing whether the immaturity of
adolescents is relevant to a determination of blame-worthiness by examining research on
juvenile cognitive and psycho-social development).
202. Id. at 801.
203. This is not to suggest that juveniles should be excused from severe criminal
sanctions as a result of their diminished culpability, only that the most severe criminal
punishment available throughout the world should be reserved for the offenders that are the
“worst of the worst,” Adam Thurschwell, After Ring, 15 FED. SENTENCING REP. 1, 9 (Dec.
2002), and not those that may have less developed logic and reasoning capabilities than
adults. By definition, if a juvenile is not quite as mentally capable, and therefore not as
morally or criminally culpable as an adult, that person cannot be considered among the
worst of the worst.
204. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (declaring that antimiscegenation
statutes are unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause
despite the fact that sixteen states—virtually all of the southern states—still outlawed
interracial marriage). The Court adds that of the states that did repeal their statutes, at least
one did so because the state court deemed the statute unconstitutional as opposed to the
legislature voting to repeal. Id. at 6 n.5.
205. 347 U.S. 483 (1959).
206. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
207. See id. at 12 (holding that although Virginia’s state legislature and a majority of the
legislatures of the southern states prohibited interracial marriages, “the freedom to marry or
not marry, a person of another race resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by
the State”); Brown, 347 U.S. at 495 (illustrating that the Court did not defer to the state
legislatures to determine whether segregation was appropriate, but rather made a
constitutional determination, based on science, that “segregation is a denial of the equal
protection of the laws”).
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punishment must be proportional to survive constitutional review,208 the
Court should apply empirical evidence on cognitive development because it
adds a necessary piece of the puzzle—it provides the facts needed to
determine the level of culpability of the offender. As the average juvenile
criminal is not as mentally culpable as an adult offender, juveniles should
not be subjected to the same sanction, because this sanction is reserved for
only the worst of the worst. The incorporation of science into the
proportionality analysis reveals that executing juveniles results in the state
taking a life without due process of law because the punishment is
disproportionate.209 Thus, regardless of the outcome of a state court, the
Supreme Court should incorporate psychological data into its independent
analysis of the constitutionality of executing juveniles in order to protect
the right to life and should subsequently restrict states’ ability to take the
life of a juvenile.
CONCLUSION
Although juveniles and the mentally retarded are categorically distinct,
the inclusive standard introduced by the Atkins Court should guide the
United States Supreme Court in Roper. In Atkins, the Court found that
“standards of decency” had evolved, making the death penalty for the
mentally retarded no longer acceptable under the Eighth Amendment’s
Cruel and Unusual Clause.210 The court explicitly held that there was
strong evidence that society viewed mentally retarded offenders as less
criminally culpable than an average criminal.211 Consequently, the Court
proposed that punishment can no longer be deemed “proportional” under
prevailing standards of decency when: (1) there is sufficient legislative
consensus against the practice (defined not as a specific number of states
prohibiting the activity, but by the “consistency of the direction of
change”); (2) death sentences for mentally retarded offenders have become
extremely unusual; and (3) the “social and professional consensus” opposes
208. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
209. The Court’s most recent analysis of proportionality of the death penalty in Atkins
suggested that diminished mental capacity does not warrant an exemption from punishment,
rather it diminishes personal culpability, and diminished culpability “places a substantive
restriction on the State’s power to take [a] life.” 536 U.S. 304, 318, 321 (2002) (quoting
Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405 (1986)).
210. 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
211. See id. at 316 (“[T]he large number of States prohibiting the execution of mentally
retarded persons (and the complete absence of States passing legislation reinstating the
power to conduct such executions) provides powerful evidence that today our society views
mentally retarded offenders as categorically less culpable than the average criminal.”); see
also id. at 320 (“[I]t is the same cognitive and behavioral impairments that make [mentally
retarded] defendants less morally culpable . . . that also make it less likely that they can
process the information . . . and, as a result, control their conduct based upon that
information.”).
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the practice.212 The Court found that “[b]ecause of their disabilities in areas
of reasoning, judgment, and control of their impulses,” the mentally
retarded do not “act with the level of moral culpability that characterizes
the most serious adult criminal conduct.”213
Focusing on the use of a “social and professional consensus” to
determine how standards of decency have evolved is a controversial
practice, once rejected by the Court in Stanford.214 The Atkins Court’s
willingness to look to the views of experts and respected organizations
when analyzing mentally retarded persons’ cognitive deficiencies,
however, suggests that the Court considers these views, while not
“dispositive,”215 certainly relevant to making a well-informed decision on
the issue of the death penalty. Because the opinions of well-respected
scientific and medical organizations are not dispositive to a conclusion that
the death penalty is unconstitutional for juveniles, such support need not be
unequivocal, but must be dependable. While the research on brain
maturation is still developing, it has come a long way since Stanford.216
There is widespread accord among the psychological and neurobiological
professional communities that juvenile cortical development is typically
somewhat deficient until the early twenties, thus indicating that adolescent
brains do not function as effectively as those of adults with regard to
decision making.217 Scientific research further reinforces the assertion that
the twin penal goals of deterrence and retribution are less effective with
respect to juveniles.218
The use of psychological and scientific research is unquestionably
relevant to determining if the imposition of the death penalty on juveniles
is “excessive,” because current research indicates that juveniles may not
have the capacity for making the reasoned decisions that adults can.219 This
science should be applied by the Roper Court to the overall calculus
introduced in Atkins because it addresses vital issues such as criminal
culpability and the requisite proportionality of the punishment, has
contributed to the evolution of society’s standards of decency since
Stanford, as exemplified through minimum age statutes, public opinion
polls, and international and professional opinion, and has been employed
212. Id. at 313-16.
213. Id. at 306 (emphasis added).
214. 492 U.S. 361, 374 (1989).
215. 536 U.S. at 317 n.21.
216. Sowell, supra note 65.
217. See supra Part II.A (detailing the numerous scientific studies that indicate that
juvenile brains’ frontal regions are not as developmentally mature as those of adult brains).
218. See supra note 171 and accompanying text (discussing the ramifications of
cognitive scientific research on the ability of the courts to justify the use of the death penalty
on juveniles).
219. Supra Part II.A.
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by the courts in lieu of legislative behavior to champion human rights.
Moreover, in deconstructing the Court’s language in Atkins, it is clear that
incorporating current research on juvenile cognitive development into the
“evolving standards of decency” framework results in an even more
persuasive case for abolishing the “shameful practice” of juvenile capital
punishment.
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POSTSCRIPT
On March 1, 2005, the United States Supreme Court decided Roper v.
Simmons. In a 5-4 decision written by Justice Kennedy, the Court set aside
the death penalty for Christopher Simmons in holding that the Eighth
Amendment forbids capital punishment for offenders who were under the
age of eighteen when they committed their crimes.220
The Court began by gauging the change in state legislative response with
respect to the juvenile death penalty that had occurred since Stanford v.
Kentucky, determining that a significant national consensus had developed
in favor of abolishing the death penalty for juveniles where five states221
had abolished the practice since 1989.222 As in Atkins v. Virginia, where
thirty states excluded the mentally retarded from the reach of the death
penalty, today thirty states also prohibit this punishment for juveniles.223
Notably, the second factor the Court addressed in its analysis was the
existence of scientific and sociological studies to support the conclusion
that juvenile offenders cannot be classified as the “worst of the worst,” a
classification required under the Eighth Amendment before the death
penalty may be imposed.224 The Court supplemented this scientific
evidence with various appendices that documented the existence of
220. Roper v. Simmons, No. 03-633, slip op. at 25 (U.S. Mar. 1, 2005).
221. Indiana, Kansas, Montana, and New York enacted legislation prohibiting the
imposition of the death penalty on juveniles, and Washington did so through judicial
decision. Id. at 10 (citing Victor L. Streib, The Juvenile Death Penalty Today: Death
Sentences and Executions for Juvenile Crimes, January 1, 1973-December 31, 2004, No. 76
(2005),
available
at
http://www.law.onu.edu/faculty/streib/documents/JuvDeath
Dec2004.pdf (last updated Jan. 31, 2005)).
It should be noted that the number of states abolishing the death penalty for juveniles
since Stanford is actually six, as the Missouri Supreme Court abolished the practice in 2003
through judicial decision in State ex rel Simmons v. Roper, which led to the Supreme Court
granting certiorari on this case. 112 S.W.3d 397 (2003).
222. Roper, No. 03-633, slip op. at 10-12. Noting the parallel to Atkins v. Virginia, the
Court held that this was compelling evidence to demonstrate a sufficient national consensus
against the death penalty for offenders who were under the age of eighteen at the time of
their crime. Id. at 10. The one striking difference that the majority noted between the two
death penalty cases, however, was that the rate at which states adopted legislation barring
the death penalty for these two groups. Id. The rate of legislative enactment prohibiting the
punishment for the mentally retarded, beginning after the Court upheld the punishment for
this group in Penry v. Lynaugh, was much more pronounced that the rate of prohibition for
the juvenile death penalty since Stanford. Id. at 11. The Court reasoned that this slower
trend was not dispositive, however, because only two states had legislation protecting the
mentally retarded before Penry, whereas twelve states had already barred the death penalty
for all juveniles at the time of Stanford, and fifteen already did so for youths who were
under the age of seventeen at the time of their crime. Id. at 12. The Court thus concluded
that it would be “the ultimate irony” if it were to deny juveniles relief from capital
punishment simply because states recognized the impropriety of the juvenile death penalty
earlier than they did for the mentally retarded. Id. at 13 (citing Simmons, 112 S.W.3d at 408
n.10).
223. Id. at 10.
224. Id. at 15.
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minimum age statutes for juveniles, demonstrating that state legislatures
clearly recognize the comparative immaturity of juveniles as compared
with adults.225 Justice Kennedy concluded that the death penalty should be
prohibited for juvenile offenders under the Cruel and Unusual Clause
because juveniles are overrepresented as a group in almost every category
of reckless behavior,226 are considerably more vulnerable to outside
influences, such as peer pressure,227 and have a mental character that is less
well-formed from that of an adult, rendering their conduct less morally
reprehensible.228 In turn, the majority concluded that the required
penological justifications of deterrence and retribution are not met with
juvenile capital punishment.229
The Roper Court then turned the focus of its analysis to the relevance of
international opinion when interpreting the Cruel and Unusual Clause.230
Justice Kennedy conducted a similar analysis to the one set forth in Part
III.C of this Comment by citing to Article 37(a) of the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child and stating that the United States is
virtually alone in the world in the use of juvenile execution.231 In citing
international law, the Court made particular note of the fact that the weight
of international opinion was premised in large part on the acceptance of the
immature cognitive capacity of juveniles.232
In dissent, Justice O’Connor expressed concern over the creation of a
categorical exemption for all juveniles and instead advocated a case-bycase analysis of individual offenders—one that she concluded could
introduce age and therefore, evidence of lessened culpability as a
mitigating factor.233 Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Thomas and
225. See id. (referencing Appendices B-D that list state statutes establishing a minimum
voting age, a minimum age to serve on a jury, and a minimum age a minor can marry
without parental or judicial consent); see also id. at 19-21 (discussing the similar distinction
made by psychiatrists between persons under eighteen years of age and adults, as
exemplified by industry standards forbidding psychiatrists from diagnosing certain
personality disorders for persons under the age of eighteen because the brain is not
considered fully mature before this age).
226. Id. at 15.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 16.
229. See id. at 17 (acknowledging the deterrent effect the death penalty may have on
juveniles, Justice Kennedy spoke to the lessened culpability that attaches to juvenile crime
and reasoned that as a result, adolescents are likely not able to conduct an adequate costbenefit analysis about the realistic possibility of execution as a penalty for their behavior).
230. See id. at 21 (justifying their consideration of international law by mentioning that
the Court has looked to the law of other countries for Eighth Amendment guidance since
1958, when they decided Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958)).
231. Id. at 22-23; see also discussion infra Part III.C.
232. Id. at 24; see also supra note 157 and accompanying text.
233. Roper v. Simmons, No. 03-633, slip op. at 1 (U.S. Mar. 1, 2005) (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting).
It is worth noting that Justice O’Connor’s language was not nearly as decisive as that of
Justice Scalia’s in his dissent. For example, Justice O’Connor mentioned the “undeniable”
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Rehnquist, responded with a scathing dissent, primarily criticizing the
majority’s refusal to follow the strictures of Stanford and other preceding
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.234 The dissenting Justices censured the
majority for imposing its own independent judgment on the
constitutionality of the death penalty for juveniles.235 Justice Scalia further
concluded that the majority had overstepped its bounds by determining that
a national consensus had developed against the juvenile death penalty,
mentioning that only eighteen of the states that permit capital punishment
(or forty-seven percent) have statutes prohibiting the execution of juvenile
offenders, and questioning the majority’s assumption that executions of
juveniles have decreased since Stanford.236

similarities between Atkins, a decision for which she joined the majority in finding
execution of the mentally retarded unconstitutional, and Roper, finding the evidence of a
national consensus in this case only “marginally weaker” than in Atkins. Id. at 9. Justice
O’Connor also mentioned that this nation’s understanding of human dignity should not be
considered independent from the values of other countries. Id. at 19. Instead, Justice
O’Connor took greater issue with the majority’s decision to deem the age of eighteen as the
line for mental maturity. According to O’Connor, mental maturity is a “matter of degree,
rather than of kind.” Id. at 14.
234. Id. at 4 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
235. See id. at 10 (“[T]he Court having pronounced that the Eighth Amendment is an
ever-changing reflection of ‘the evolving standards of decency’ of our society, it makes no
sense for the Justices then to prescribe those standards rather than discern them from the
practices of our people . . . . By what conceivable warrant can nine lawyers presume to be
the authoritative conscience of the Nation?”).
236. Id. at 3-9.

